Search

Commentary and technical data relating to the 2011 target renewal.

This paper develops a general equilibrium model to assess central bank digital currency (CBDC) design in a monetary system where traditional banks and “crypto banks” (i.e., banks that issue stablecoins) coexist. We compare tokenized and non-tokenized CBDC, showing that their desirability depends on the reliability of private money provision, the availability of collateral assets and the features of the crypto sector.

After the financial crisis of 2007–09, many jurisdictions introduced new banking regulations to make banks more resilient and less likely to fail. These regulations included tighter limits for the quality and quantity of bank capital and introduced minimum standards for liquidity. But what was the impact of these changes?

We propose a macroeconomic model with a nonlinear Phillips curve that has a flat slope when inflationary pressures are subdued and steepens when inflationary pressures are elevated. Our model can generate more sizable inflation surges due to cost-push and demand shocks than a standard linearized model when inflation is high.

We identify two channels that affect the relationship between inflation and unemployment. First, inflation lowers wages because unemployed suffer more from inflation than employed, generating a positive relationship. Second, inflation increases firms’ financing costs, generating a negative relationship. Improvements in firm financing conditions can induce the relationship to switch signs.

This note analyzes different economic models of a central bank digital currency (CBDC) ecosystem where the central bank chooses different levels of market involvement and usage of policy levers. The analysis suggests that there are trade-offs between the costs to the central bank and its ability to achieve policy goals like universal access.

How do households respond when they receive unanticipated income, such as an inheritance or government stimulus cheque? This paper studies these windfall income shocks through a model of household behaviour that generates a realistic consumption response for households along the entire distribution of wealth.

In the interbank market, banks will sometimes trade below the central bank's deposit rate. We explain this anomaly using a theory based on market frictions and relationship lending.

The Canadian overnight repo market persistently shows signs of latent funding pressure around month-end periods. Both the overnight repo rate and Bank of Canada liquidity provision tend to rise in these windows. This paper proposes three non-mutually exclusive hypotheses to explain this phenomenon.

A model of over-the-counter markets is proposed. Some asset buyers are informed in that they can identify high quality assets. Heterogeneous sellers with private information choose what type of buyers they want to trade with.