Search

The hedge fund industry has been growing so quickly that meetings like this one are welcome—they provide a chance to step back and look at context and trends. And that's what I propose to do this morning. Specifically, I'd like to speak about volatility in both the real economy and in financial markets and discuss how it has been affected by monetary policy and financial innovation.

This article reviews arguments in the literature for and against price-level targeting, focusing on its costs and benefits compared with inflation targeting. Benefits of price-level targeting include the effect on forward-looking inflation expectations; the ability to substitute for commitment by a central bank to its future policies; lessening forecast errors; better economic performance in response to real shocks because of lower wage indexation; and a reduction in the problem of the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates.

This special issue of the Review, “Lessons from the Financial Crisis,” examines the recent research on the role of liquidity in the financial system and on the public policy responses that aimed to restore stability to the financial system during the crisis and to foster economic recovery.

This article describes experimental economics, in general, and new developments in experimental macroeconomics, in particular. The approach has a clear niche in providing evidence on economic phenomena that cannot be observed directly or that are difficult to measure. Experimental work conducted by Bank of Canada economists has shed light on a number of issues important to monetary policy, such as the relative efficacy between price-level and inflation targeting, and the nature of inflation expectations formation.

The premise that exchange rate pass-through has declined is critically reassessed; intensity in the negative feedback process between financial sector developments and the real economy during the recent global crisis is examined; update on past decade’s changing trends in debt issuance in Canada relative to those in other capital markets.

The Governor highlighted the global slowdown as the major economic challenge of the past year. But he said that there were also key changes within the Bank of Canada related to the implementation of monetary policy. In particular, he spoke of the success of the Bank's new system of eight fixed dates per year for announcing interest rate decisions. He also set out in detail the process that leads to those decisions.

Cover page

Chargex

The artefacts on the cover are part of the National Currency Collection of the Bank of Canada.

Photography by Gord Carter

The conduct of monetary policy within an inflation-targeting framework requires the establishment of an inflation-target horizon, which is the average time it takes inflation to return to the target. Policy-makers have an interest in communicating this horizon, since it is likely to help anchor inflation expectations. This article focuses on the determination of the appropriate policy horizon by reporting on two recent Bank of Canada studies. The evidence suggests that the current target horizon of six to eight quarters remains appropriate. It is important to note that the duration of the optimal inflation-target horizon varies widely, depending on the combination of shocks to the economy. In rare cases when the financial accelerator is triggered by a persistent shock, such as an asset-price bubble, it may be appropriate to take a longer view of the inflation-target horizon.

Economists in the nineteenth century spent considerable time discussing the merits of a free-banking system, in which each commercial bank would be able to issue its own notes and deposits, subject to a convertibility requirement backed by its own gold reserves. Such a system, the proponents argued, would be able to deliver price-level stability yet be flexible enough to withstand the vicissitudes of the business cycle. Moreover, there would be no need for central banks. While this idea has received less attention in recent years, some economists still put it forward as a practical alternative to the current system. Laidler suggests that the centralizing tendencies in banking would inevitably undermine competition within a free-banking system, and lead to the natural emergence of one dominant bank. Other developments in the twentieth century, most notably the demise of the gold standard and widespread agreement that governments should play a determining role in setting monetary policy goals, have also limited the practicality of such a system. Laidler examines the Bank of Canada's history from the free-banking perspective and concludes that the current system of inflation targeting provides a much better anchor for orderly price-level behaviour than the free-banking system's convertibility could ever guarantee.

The Bank opened its doors on 11 March 1935, at the height of the Great Depression, and immediately faced enormous challenges. In meeting those challenges, the new Bank of Canada drew on the experience of other, established central banks. It received valuable guidance in functions such as the issuance of bank notes, managing foreign exchange reserves, and promoting financial stability.