Oleksandr Shcherbakov - Latest

• Ecosystem Models for a Central Bank Digital Currency: Analysis Framework and Potential Models

  Staff Discussion Paper 2024-13 Youming Liu, Francisco Rivadeneyra, Edona Reshidi, Oleksandr Shcherbakov, André Stenzel

  This note analyzes different economic models of a central bank digital currency (CBDC) ecosystem where the central bank chooses different levels of market involvement and usage of policy levers. The analysis suggests that there are trade-offs between the costs to the central bank and its ability to achieve policy goals like universal access.

  Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff discussion papers Topic(s): Central bank research, Digital currencies and fintech, Financial services JEL Code(s): E, E5, E58, E6, E61, L, L5

• Equilibrium in Two-Sided Markets for Payments: Consumer Awareness and the Welfare Cost of the Interchange Fee

  Staff Working Paper 2022-15 Kim Huynh, Gradon Nicholls, Oleksandr Shcherbakov

  We construct and estimate a structural two-stage model of equilibrium in a market for payments in order to quantify the network externalities and identify the main determinants of consumer and merchant decisions.

  Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Topic(s): Bank notes, Digital currencies and fintech, Econometric and statistical methods, Financial services JEL Code(s): C, C5, C51, D, D1, D12, E, E4, E42, L, L1, L14

• Welfare Analysis of Equilibria With and Without Early Termination Fees in the US Wireless Industry

  Staff Working Paper 2020-9 Joseph Cullen, Nicolas Schutz, Oleksandr Shcherbakov

  The elimination of long-term contracts and early termination fees (ETFs) in the US wireless industry at the end of 2015 increased monthly service fees by 2 to 5 percent. Nevertheless, consumers are clearly better off without ETFs. While firms’ revenues from ETFs vanish, their profits from monthly fees increase. As a result, the overall effect on producer profits is less clear.

  Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Topic(s): Econometric and statistical methods, Firm dynamics, Market structure and pricing JEL Code(s): D, D2, D22, L, L1, L15, L9, L96

• Demand for Payment Services and Consumer Welfare: The Introduction of a Central Bank Digital Currency

  Staff Working Paper 2020-7 Kim Huynh, Jozsef Molnar, Oleksandr Shcherbakov, Qinghui Yu

  Using a two-stage model, we study the determinants of Canadian consumers’ choices of payment method at the point of sale. We estimate consumer preferences and adoption costs for various combinations of payment methods. We analyze how introducing a central bank digital currency would affect the market equilibrium.

  Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Topic(s): Bank notes, Digital currencies and fintech, Financial services JEL Code(s): C, C5, C51, E, E4, E42, L, L1, L14, L5, L52

• Explaining the Interplay Between Merchant Acceptance and Consumer Adoption in Two-Sided Markets for Payment Methods

  Staff Working Paper 2019-32 Kim Huynh, Gradon Nicholls, Oleksandr Shcherbakov

  Recent consumer and merchant surveys show a decrease in the use of cash at the point of sale. Increasingly, consumers and merchants have access to a growing array of payment innovations as substitutes for cash.

  Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Topic(s): Bank notes, Digital currencies and fintech, Econometric and statistical methods, Financial services JEL Code(s): C, C5, C51, L, L1, L13, L15, L8, L81, L9, L96

• Firm-level Investment Under Imperfect Capital Markets in Ukraine

  Staff Working Paper 2019-14 Oleksandr Shcherbakov

  This paper develops and estimates a model of firm-level fixed capital investment when firms face borrowing constraints.

  Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Topic(s): Econometric and statistical methods, Economic models, Firm dynamics JEL Code(s): C, C6, C61, C63, D, D2, D24, G, G3, G31

• Identifying the Degree of Collusion Under Proportional Reduction

  Staff Working Paper 2017-51 Oleksandr Shcherbakov, Naoki Wakamori

  Proportional reduction is a common cartel practice in which cartel members reduce their output proportionately. We develop a method to quantify this reduction relative to a benchmark market equilibrium scenario and relate the reduction to the traditional conduct parameter.

  Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Topic(s): Econometric and statistical methods, Market structure and pricing JEL Code(s): C, C3, C36, D, D2, D22, L, L4, L41