This paper studies the capital accumulation and welfare implications of reducing capital income taxation in a general equilibrium economy with uninsurable investment risks.
We show how to use optimal control theory to derive optimal time-consistent Markov-perfect government policies in nonlinear dynamic general equilibrium models, extending the result of Cohen and Michel (1988) for models with quadratic objective functions and linear dynamics. We replace private agents' costates by flexible functions of current states in the government's maximization problem.
The author empirically assesses the effects of institutional and political factors on the need and willingness of governments to make large fiscal adjustments.
In two recent papers, Jensen (2002) and Walsh (2003), using a hybrid New Keynesian model, demonstrate that a regime that targets either nominal income growth or the change in the output gap can effectively replicate the outcome under commitment and hence reduce the size of the stabilization bias.
Recent empirical evidence suggests that private consumption is crowded-in by government spending. This outcome violates existing macroeconomic theory, according to which the negative wealth effect brought about by a rise in public expenditure should decrease consumption.
The authors study the macroeconomic consequences of large military buildups using a New Neoclassical Synthesis (NNS) approach that combines nominal rigidities within imperfectly competitive goods and labour markets. They show that the predictions of the NNS framework generally are consistent with the sign, timing, and magnitude of how hours worked, after-tax real wages, and output actually respond to an upsurge in military purchases.
One of the central lessons learned from the Great Depression was that adjusting government spending each year to balance the budget increases the volatility of output.
This paper describes the positive effect that corporate income tax has on capital formation in the presence of liquidity constraints and uninsurable risk.