CBDC and Monetary Policy Staff analytical note 2020-4 Mohammad Davoodalhosseini, Francisco Rivadeneyra, Yu Zhu Improving the conduct of monetary policy is unlikely to be the main motivation for central banks to issue a central bank digital currency (CBDC). While some argue that a CBDC could allow more complex transfer schemes or the ability to break below the zero lower bound, we find these benefits might be small or difficult to realize in practice. Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff analytical notes JEL Code(s): E, E4, E41, E5, E51, E52 Research Theme(s): Monetary policy, Monetary policy framework and transmission, Monetary policy tools and implementation, Money and payments, Digital assets and fintech
The Effect of Mortgage Rate Resets on Debt: Evidence from TransUnion (Part I) Staff analytical note 2020-2 Katya Kartashova This note studies how decreases in mortgage rates affect the behaviour of borrowers in terms of spending on durable goods and repaying debt. Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff analytical notes JEL Code(s): D, D1, D12, D14, E, E4, E43, E5, E52, G, G2, G21, R, R3, R31 Research Theme(s): Financial system, Household and business credit, Monetary policy, Monetary policy framework and transmission
The Power of Helicopter Money Revisited: A New Keynesian Perspective Staff discussion paper 2020-1 Thomas J. Carter, Rhys R. Mendes We analyze money financing of fiscal transfers (helicopter money) in two simple New Keynesian models: a “textbook” model in which all money is non-interest-bearing (e.g., all money is currency), and a more realistic model with interest-bearing reserves. Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff discussion papers JEL Code(s): E, E1, E12, E4, E41, E43, E5, E51, E52, E58, E6, E61, E63 Research Theme(s): Models and tools, Economic models, Monetary policy, Monetary policy framework and transmission, Monetary policy tools and implementation
Managing GDP Tail Risk Staff working paper 2020-3 Thibaut Duprey, Alexander Ueberfeldt Models for macroeconomic forecasts do not usually take into account the risk of a crisis—that is, a sudden large decline in gross domestic product (GDP). However, policy-makers worry about such GDP tail risk because of its large social and economic costs. Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers JEL Code(s): D, D8, E, E4, E44, E5, E52, E58, G, G0, G01 Research Theme(s): Financial system, Financial stability and systemic risk, Models and tools, Economic models, Monetary policy, Monetary policy framework and transmission
Social Learning and Monetary Policy at the Effective Lower Bound Staff working paper 2020-2 Jasmina Arifovic, Alex Grimaud, Isabelle Salle, Gauthier Vermandel This research develops a model in which the economy is directly influenced by how pessimistic or optimistic economic agents are about the future. The agents may hold different views and update them as new economic data become available. Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers JEL Code(s): C, C8, C82, E, E3, E32, E5, E52 Research Theme(s): Models and tools, Economic models, Monetary policy, Inflation dynamics and pressures, Monetary policy framework and transmission, Monetary policy tools and implementation
Monetary Policy and Government Debt Dynamics Without Commitment Staff working paper 2019-52 Dmitry Matveev I show that maturity considerations affect the optimal conduct of monetary and fiscal policy during a period of government debt reduction. I consider a New Keynesian model and study a dynamic game of monetary and fiscal policy authorities without commitment, characterizing the incentives that drive the choice of interest rate. Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers JEL Code(s): E, E5, E52, E6, E62, E63 Research Theme(s): Financial markets and funds management, Funds management, Models and tools, Economic models, Monetary policy, Monetary policy framework and transmission, Monetary policy tools and implementation
Furor over the Fed : Presidential Tweets and Central Bank Independence Staff analytical note 2019-33 Antoine Camous, Dmitry Matveev We illustrate how market data can be informative about the interactions between monetary and fiscal policy. Federal funds futures are private contracts that reflect investor’s expectations about monetary policy decisions. Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff analytical notes JEL Code(s): E, E4, E44, E5, E52, E58 Research Theme(s): Financial markets and funds management, Market functioning, Financial system, Financial stability and systemic risk, Monetary policy, Monetary policy framework and transmission
A Comprehensive Evaluation of Measures of Core Inflation in Canada: An Update Staff discussion paper 2019-9 Helen Lao, Ceciline Steyn We provide an updated evaluation of the value of various measures of core inflation that could be used in the conduct of monetary policy. We find that the Bank of Canada’s current preferred measures of core inflation—CPI-trim, CPI-median and CPI-common—continue to outperform alternative core measures across a range of criteria. Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff discussion papers JEL Code(s): E, E3, E31, E5, E52 Research Theme(s): Monetary policy, Inflation dynamics and pressures, Monetary policy framework and transmission
Financial Frictions, Durable Goods and Monetary Policy Staff working paper 2019-31 Ugochi Emenogu, Leo Michelis Financial frictions affect how much consumers spend on durable and non-durable goods. Borrowers can face both loan-to-value (LTV) constraints and payment-to-income (PTI) constraints. Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers JEL Code(s): E, E4, E44, E5, E52 Research Theme(s): Financial system, Household and business credit, Models and tools, Economic models, Monetary policy, Monetary policy framework and transmission
Central Bank Communication That Works: Lessons from Lab Experiments Staff working paper 2019-21 Oleksiy Kryvtsov, Luba Petersen We use controlled laboratory experiments to test the causal effects of central bank communication on economic expectations and to distinguish the underlying mechanisms of those effects. In an experiment where subjects learn to forecast economic variables, we find that central bank communication has a stabilizing effect on individual and aggregate outcomes and that the size of the effect varies with the type of communication. Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers JEL Code(s): C, C9, D, D8, D84, E, E3, E5, E52 Research Theme(s): Models and tools, Econometric, statistical and computational methods, Economic models, Monetary policy, Monetary policy framework and transmission, Monetary policy tools and implementation