Radoslav Raykov

Senior Economist

Radoslav Raykov is a Senior Economist in the Financial Stability Department at the Bank of Canada. His research focuses on the theory of risk and uncertainty with applications to central counterparties, insurance companies and firms with uncertain costs. Prior to joining the Bank of Canada, he worked at the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston and taught at Harvard University. He holds a B.A. from Harvard University a Ph.D. in Economics from Boston College.

Contact

Radoslav Raykov

Senior Economist
Financial Stability
Market Infrastructures Oversight

Bank of Canada
234 Wellington Street
Ottawa, ON, K1A 0G9

Curriculum vitae

Latest

Stability and Efficiency in Decentralized Two‐Sided Markets with Weak Preferences

Staff Working Paper 2017-4 Radoslav Raykov
Many decentralized markets are able to attain a stable outcome despite the absence of a central authority (Roth and Vande Vate, 1990). A stable matching, however, need not be efficient if preferences are weak. This raises the question whether a decentralized market with weak preferences can attain Pareto efficiency in the absence of a central matchmaker.
Content Type(s): Staff Research, Staff Working Papers Topic(s): Economic models JEL Code(s): C, C7, C78, D, D6, D61

To Share or Not to Share? Uncovered Losses in a Derivatives Clearinghouse

Staff Working Paper 2016-4 Radoslav Raykov
This paper studies how the allocation of residual losses affects trading and welfare in a central counterparty. I compare loss sharing under two loss-allocation mechanisms – variation margin haircutting and cash calls – and study the privately and socially optimal degree of loss sharing.

Optimal Margining and Margin Relief in Centrally Cleared Derivatives Markets

Staff Working Paper 2014-29 Radoslav Raykov
A major policy challenge posed by derivatives clearinghouses is that their collateral requirements can rise sharply in times of stress, reducing market liquidity and further exacerbating downturns.

Uncertain Costs and Vertical Differentiation in an Insurance Duopoly

Staff Working Paper 2014-14 Radoslav Raykov
Classical oligopoly models predict that firms differentiate vertically as a way of softening price competition, but some metrics suggest very little quality differentiation in the U.S. auto insurance market.
Content Type(s): Staff Research, Staff Working Papers Topic(s): Economic models, Market structure and pricing JEL Code(s): D, D4, D43, D8, D81, G, G2, G22, L, L2, L22

See More

Other

Refereed Journal

“Catastrophe Insurance Equilibrium with Correlated Claims,”
Theory and Decision, 2014

Research Interests

  • Risk and Uncertainty
  • Decision theory
  • Industrial Organization

About

Follow the Bank