D4 - Market Structure and Pricing

• Non-competing Data Intermediaries

  Staff Working Paper 2020-28 Shota Ichihashi

  I study a model of competing data intermediaries (e.g., online platforms and data brokers) that collect personal data from consumers and sell it to downstream firms.

  Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Research Topic(s): Economic models JEL Code(s): D, D4, D42, D43, D8, D80, L, L1, L12

• Dynamic Competition in Negotiated Price Markets

  Staff Working Paper 2020-22 Jason Allen, Shaoteng Li

  Repeated interactions between borrowers and lenders create the possibility of dynamic pricing: lenders compete aggressively with low prices to attract new borrowers and then raise their prices once borrowers have made a commitment. We find such pricing patterns in the Canadian mortgage market.

  Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Research Topic(s): Financial institutions, Financial services, Market structure and pricing JEL Code(s): D, D4, G, G2, G21, L, L2

• Resolving Failed Banks: Uncertainty, Multiple Bidding & Auction Design

  Staff Working Paper 2019-30 Jason Allen, Robert Clark, Brent Hickman, Eric Richert

  Bank resolution is costly. In the United States, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) typically resolves failing banks by auction.

  Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Research Topic(s): Econometric and statistical methods, Financial institutions JEL Code(s): C, C5, C57, D, D4, D44, G, G2, G21

• The Cost of the Government Bond Buyback and Switch Programs in Canada

  Staff Analytical Note 2018-41 Bo Young Chang, Jun Yang, Parker Liu

  This note examines the costs of the Government of Canada bond buyback and switch programs between 1998 and 2016. Our analysis indicates that the auction design of the buyback program was effective in retiring government debt with minimal costs resulting from bid shading in auctions and price impact.

  Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff analytical notes Research Topic(s): Debt management JEL Code(s): D, D4, D44

• Adverse Selection with Heterogeneously Informed Agents

  Staff Working Paper 2018-7 Mohammad Davoodalhosseini

  A model of over-the-counter markets is proposed. Some asset buyers are informed in that they can identify high quality assets. Heterogeneous sellers with private information choose what type of buyers they want to trade with.

  Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Research Topic(s): Economic models, Financial markets, Financial stability, Financial system regulation and policies, Market structure and pricing JEL Code(s): D, D4, D40, D8, D82, D83, G, G0, G01, G1, G10, G2, G20

• Repo Market Functioning when the Interest Rate Is Low or Negative

  Staff Discussion Paper 2017-3 Jean-Sébastien Fontaine, James Hately, Adrian Walton

  This paper investigates how a low or negative overnight interest rate might affect the Canadian repo markets. The main conclusion is that the repo market for general collateral will continue to function effectively.

  Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff discussion papers Research Topic(s): Financial markets, Interest rates, Market structure and pricing JEL Code(s): D, D4, G, G1, G10, G12

• Information Sharing and Bargaining in Buyer-Seller Networks

  Staff Working Paper 2016-63 Sofia Priazhkina, Frank H. Page

  This paper presents a model of strategic buyer-seller networks with information exchange between sellers. Prior to engaging in bargaining with buyers, sellers can share access to buyers for a negotiated transfer. We study how this information exchange affects overall market prices, volumes and welfare, given different initial market conditions and information sharing rules.

  Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Research Topic(s): Economic models, Firm dynamics, Market structure and pricing JEL Code(s): C, C7, C71, C78, D, D2, D21, D4, D43, D8, D85, L, L1, L13

• Identification and Estimation of Risk Aversion in First-Price Auctions with Unobserved Auction Heterogeneity

  Staff Working Paper 2016-23 Serafin Grundl, Yu Zhu

  This paper shows point identification in first-price auction models with risk aversion and unobserved auction heterogeneity by exploiting multiple bids from each auction and variation in the number of bidders. The required exclusion restriction is shown to be consistent with a large class of entry models.

  Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Research Topic(s): Econometric and statistical methods JEL Code(s): C, C1, C14, C5, C57, D, D4, D44, L, L0, L00

• Uncertain Costs and Vertical Differentiation in an Insurance Duopoly

  Staff Working Paper 2014-14 Radoslav Raykov

  Classical oligopoly models predict that firms differentiate vertically as a way of softening price competition, but some metrics suggest very little quality differentiation in the U.S. auto insurance market.

  Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Research Topic(s): Economic models, Market structure and pricing JEL Code(s): D, D4, D43, D8, D81, G, G2, G22, L, L2, L22

• Some Economics of Private Digital Currency

  Staff Working Paper 2013-38 Joshua S. Gans, Hanna Halaburda

  This paper reviews some recent developments in digital currency, focusing on platform-sponsored currencies such as Facebook Credits.

  Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Research Topic(s): Bank notes, Digital currencies and fintech, Economic models, Payment clearing and settlement systems JEL Code(s): D, D4, D42, E, E4, L, L5, L51