Non-bank financial intermediation: Canada’s submission to the 2024 global monitoring report Staff analytical note 2025-19 Elba Gomez Navas Acevedo, Thomas Thorn We share insights about non-bank financial intermediation in Canada in 2023. These data were collected as part of the Bank of Canada’s contribution to the Financial Stability Board’s Global Monitoring Report on Non-Bank Financial Intermediation. Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff analytical notes JEL Code(s): G, G2, G21, G22, G23 Research Theme(s): Financial system, Financial institutions and intermediation, Financial stability and systemic risk
Are Hedge Funds a Hedge for Increasing Government Debt Issuance? Staff discussion paper 2025-7 Adam Epp, Jeffrey Gao This paper studies the rapid increase since 2019 of Government of Canada (GoC) debt issuance alongside greater hedge fund participation at GoC bond auctions. We find a systematic relationship between GoC debt stock and hedge fund bidding shares at auction. Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff discussion papers JEL Code(s): D, D4, D44, G, G1, G12, G2, G23, H, H6, H63 Research Theme(s): Financial markets and funds management, Funds management, Financial system, Financial institutions and intermediation, Financial stability and systemic risk
The Contingent Term Repo Facility: Lessons learned and an update Staff analytical note 2025-12 Jessie Ziqing Chen, Parnell Chu, Scott Kinnear In 2024, the Bank of Canada reviewed and updated its Contingent Term Repo Facility policy, incorporating lessons learned from the COVID-19 pandemic and other global market developments, such as the UK gilt crisis in September 2022. This paper accompanies the March 17, 2025, Contingent Term Repo Facility market notice and provides background information and further details about the design of the revised policy. Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff analytical notes JEL Code(s): E, E5, E58, F, F6, F68, G, G0, G01, G2, G23 Research Theme(s): Financial system, Financial institutions and intermediation, Financial stability and systemic risk, Monetary policy, Monetary policy tools and implementation
Stress testing central counterparties for resolution planning Staff analytical note 2025-11 Katherine Brennan, Bo Young Chang, Alper Odabasioglu, Radoslav Raykov The Bank of Canada completed its first resolution plan for the Canadian Derivatives and Clearing Corporation (CDCC) in 2024. To estimate the resolution costs, we apply the extreme value theory method to simulate the credit losses that would result from extreme scenarios where multiple clearing members default at the same time. Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff analytical notes JEL Code(s): G, G1, G17, G2, G23, G28 Research Theme(s): Financial system, Financial stability and systemic risk, Financial system regulation and oversight, Money and payments, Payment and financial market infrastructures
The new repo tri-party Canadian Collateral Management Service: Benefits to the financial system and to the Bank of Canada Staff analytical note 2025-6 Philippe Muller, Maksym Padalko The Canadian Collateral Management Service (CCMS) is a new tri-party collateral management service offered by the TMX Group and Clearstream. CCMS will enhance Canada’s financial infrastructure for securities financing transactions, including for the repurchase, or repo, market that is a core funding market in Canada. We explain the importance of the repo market and describe the benefits of the CCMS for market participants and for the Bank of Canada. Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff analytical notes JEL Code(s): G, G1, G2, G23 Research Theme(s): Financial markets and funds management, Market functioning, Financial system, Financial institutions and intermediation, Money and payments, Payment and financial market infrastructures
Non-Bank Dealing and Liquidity Bifurcation in Fixed-Income Markets Staff working paper 2025-2 Michael Brolley, David Cimon We model non-bank entry into fixed-income markets and state-dependent liquidity. Non-bank financial institutions improve liquidity more during normal times than in stress. Banks may become less reliable to marginal clients, exacerbating the difference in liquidity between normal and stressed times. Central bank lending during stress may limit this harmful division. Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers JEL Code(s): G, G1, G10, G2, G20, G21, G23, L, L1, L10, L13, L14 Research Theme(s): Financial markets and funds management, Market functioning, Market structure, Financial system, Financial institutions and intermediation
The International Exposure of the Canadian Banking System Staff working paper 2025-1 Christian Friedrich, Hanno Friedrich, Nick Lawrence, Javier Cortes Orihuela, Phoebe Tian In 2023, the share of Canadian banks’ foreign assets and liabilities amounted to around 50%. While Canadian banks engage domestically mostly with households and non-financial corporations, their most common counterparties abroad are non-bank financial institutions. Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers JEL Code(s): F, F2, F21, F23, F3, F31, F32, G, G2, G21, G23, G3 Research Theme(s): Financial system, Financial institutions and intermediation, Financial stability and systemic risk, Structural challenges, International trade, finance and competitiveness
How foreign central banks can affect liquidity in the Government of Canada bond market Staff analytical note 2024-26 Patrick Aldridge, Jabir Sandhu, Sofia Tchamova We find that foreign central banks own a large share of Government of Canada (GoC) bonds and tend to hold their positions for longer than other types of asset managers. This buy-and-hold behaviour could offer benefits. For example, foreign central banks may be less likely than other asset managers to sell bonds and add to strains on market liquidity in periods of turmoil. However, foreign central banks’ buy-and-hold behaviour combined with their minimal lending of GoC bonds in securities-financing markets, as observed in our available data, can potentially lower liquidity because fewer GoC bonds are available for others to transact in secondary markets. Indeed, we find that higher levels of foreign central banks’ GoC bond holdings are related to lower liquidity. Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff analytical notes JEL Code(s): E, E5, E58, F, F3, F30, F31, G, G0, G01, G1, G11, G12, G15, G2, G23 Research Theme(s): Financial markets and funds management, Funds management, Market functioning, Financial system, Financial stability and systemic risk
Could all-to-all trading improve liquidity in the Government of Canada bond market? Staff analytical note 2024-17 Jabir Sandhu, Rishi Vala We find that on any given day, nearly half of Government of Canada bond transactions by clients of dealers can be offset with other clients, including during the turmoil in March 2020. Our results show that under certain conditions clients could potentially trade directly with each other and are a step towards understanding the relevance of broader all-to-all trading in the Government of Canada bond market. Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff analytical notes JEL Code(s): D, D4, D47, D5, D53, G, G0, G01, G1, G12, G13, G14, G2, G21, G23 Research Theme(s): Financial markets and funds management, Market functioning, Market structure, Financial system, Financial stability and systemic risk
How big is cash-futures basis trading in Canada’s government bond market? Staff analytical note 2024-16 Andreas Uthemann, Rishi Vala Cash-futures basis trading has grown alongside the Government of Canada bond futures market. We examine this growth over time in relation to Government of Canada bond and repurchase agreement markets and provide details on the type of market participants that engage in this type of trading activity. Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff analytical notes JEL Code(s): D, D4, D47, D5, D53, G, G1, G12, G2, G23 Research Theme(s): Financial markets and funds management, Market functioning, Market structure, Financial system, Financial stability and systemic risk