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We document a new empirical finding in the foreign exchange market: currency returns show systematic reversals around the benchmark fixings. Specifically, the US dollar, on average, appreciates in the hours before fixes and depreciates after fixes.

In these excerpts from a presentation to a conference in Toronto, Deputy Governor Charles Freedman analyses the way in which the monetary conditions index (MCI) enters into the Bank's thinking and actions. He describes how the Bank works in the context of a forward-looking assessment of economic developments and inflationary pressures to decide upon a desired path for the MCI that will result in a rate of inflation, six to eight quarters ahead, that is within the Bank's target band. Mr. Freedman also uses specific examples to explain how various shocks to the economy can change the Bank's desired path for monetary conditions. He describes the role that tactical considerations relating to market circumstances play regarding the timing of Bank actions to bring monetary conditions onto the desired path and emphasizes the need to give precedence to steadying nervous markets.

One theme that I heard repeatedly in Washington is that 2004 is turning out to be a better year than many had thought, particularly over the first half of the year. Indeed, the IMF is now projecting global economic growth of 5 per cent in 2004, which would be a marked improvement from the 3.9 per cent rate seen in 2003.

Using data on Canadian bond futures, we examine how high-frequency traders (HFTs) interact with institutions building large positions. In contrast to recent findings, we find HFTs in the data act as small-sized liquidity suppliers, and we reject the hypothesis that they engage in back running, a predatory trading strategy.

This paper reviews the range of extraordinary programs launched by the Bank of Canada in response to the pandemic-related financial market disruption. It provides some recommendations for future interventions to ensure the programs are appropriately structured for the financial and economic stresses they are intended to address.

A conventional bond is a debt instrument consisting of a series of periodic coupon payments plus the repayment of the principal at maturity. As the name suggests, a zero-coupon bond has no coupon payments. It has only a single payment consisting of the repayment of the principal at maturity. The zero-coupon bond is sold at a discount and then redeemed for its face value at maturity. The return to the investor is the difference between the face value of the bond and its discounted purchase price. In this article, the author examines the investment characteristics of zero-coupon bonds. In particular, a type of zero-coupon bond known as a strip bond is discussed. A strip bond is created by stripping coupon payments from conventional bonds. The strip bond market in Canada has grown substantially since the late 1980s and is now an integral part of Canadian fixed-income markets. As well, the opportunity to trade in the strip bond market improves the liquidity and efficiency of Canadian fixed-income markets, thus helping to reduce the overall cost of borrowing to the government.

We build a network formation game of firms with trade flows to study the adoption and usage of a new digital currency as an alternative to correspondent banking.

The authors examine whether monetary policy should and could do more to lean against financial imbalances (such as those associated with asset-price bubbles or unsustainable credit expansion) as they are building up, or whether its role should be limited to cleaning up the economic consequences as the imbalances unwind.

Deputy Governor Tim Lane discusses the links between monetary policy and financial stability.

What risks could stablecoins pose to the financial system? We argue that the stabilization mechanisms of stablecoins give rise to the risk of confidence runs, which can propagate to broader cryptoasset markets and the traditional financial sector. We also argue that stablecoins can contribute to financial stability risks by facilitating the buildup of leverage and liquidity mismatch in decentralized finance. Such risks cannot be addressed by ensuring the price stability of stablecoins alone. Finally, we explore the potential implications of stablecoins for the current system of bank-intermediated credit and for monetary policy.