Radoslav Raykov - Latest

• Is This Normal? The Cost of Assuming that Derivatives Have Normal Returns

  Staff Working Paper 2024-46 Radoslav Raykov

  Derivatives exchanges often determine collateral requirements, which are fundamental to market safety, with dated risk models assuming normal returns. However, derivatives returns are heavy-tailed, which leads to the systematic under-collection of collateral (margin). This paper uses extreme value theory (EVT) to evaluate the cost of this margin inadequacy to market participants in the event of default.

  Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Topic(s): Financial institutions, Financial stability JEL Code(s): G, G1, G10, G11, G2, G20

• Decomposing Large Banks’ Systemic Trading Losses

  Staff Working Paper 2024-6 Radoslav Raykov

  Do banks realize simultaneous trading losses because they invest in the same assets, or because different assets are subject to the same macro shocks? This paper decomposes the comovements of bank trading losses into two orthogonal channels: portfolio overlap and common shocks.

  Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Topic(s): Financial institutions, Financial stability JEL Code(s): G, G1, G10, G11, G2, G20

• Considerations for the allocation of non-default losses by financial market infrastructures

  Staff Analytical Note 2022-16 Daniele Costanzo, Radoslav Raykov

  Non-default losses of financial market infrastructures (FMIs) have gained attention due to their potential impacts on FMIs and FMI participants, and the lack of a common approach to address them. A key question is, who should absorb these losses?

  Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff analytical notes Topic(s): Financial markets, Financial system regulation and policies JEL Code(s): G, G2, G23, G28, G3, G32, G33

• Asymmetric Systemic Risk

  Staff Working Paper 2022-19 Radoslav Raykov, Consuelo Silva-Buston

  Bank regulation presumes risks spill over more easily from large banks to the banking system than vice versa. Interestingly, we observe this is not the case. We find that the capacity to transmit risk is larger in the system-to-bank direction, leading to an increased default risk.

  Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Topic(s): Financial institutions, Financial stability, Financial system regulation and policies JEL Code(s): G, G1, G10, G2, G20

• Systemic Risk and Portfolio Diversification: Evidence from the Futures Market

  Staff Working Paper 2021-50 Radoslav Raykov

  This paper explores how the Canadian futures market contributed to banks’ systemic risk during the 2008 financial crisis. It finds that core banks as a whole traded against the periphery, in this way increasing their risk of simultaneous losses.

  Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Topic(s): Financial institutions, Financial markets JEL Code(s): G, G1, G10, G2, G20

• Systemic Risk and Collateral Adequacy

  Staff Working Paper 2019-23 Radoslav Raykov

  Many derivatives markets use collateral requirements calculated with industry-standard but dated methods that are not designed with systemic risk in mind. This paper explores whether the conservative nature of conventional collateral requirements outweighs their lack of consideration of systemic risk.

  Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Topic(s): Financial institutions, Financial markets JEL Code(s): G, G1, G10, G2, G20

• Multibank Holding Companies and Bank Stability

  Staff Working Paper 2018-51 Radoslav Raykov, Consuelo Silva-Buston

  This paper studies the relationship between bank holding company affiliation and the individual and systemic risk of banks. Using the 2005 hurricane season in the US as an exogenous shock to bank balance sheets, we show that banks that are part of a holding parent company are more resilient than independent banks.

  Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Topic(s): Financial institutions, Financial stability JEL Code(s): G, G1, G2

• Stability and Efficiency in Decentralized Two‐Sided Markets with Weak Preferences

  Staff Working Paper 2017-4 Radoslav Raykov

  Many decentralized markets are able to attain a stable outcome despite the absence of a central authority (Roth and Vande Vate, 1990). A stable matching, however, need not be efficient if preferences are weak. This raises the question whether a decentralized market with weak preferences can attain Pareto efficiency in the absence of a central matchmaker.

  Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Topic(s): Economic models JEL Code(s): C, C7, C78, D, D6, D61

• To Share or Not to Share? Uncovered Losses in a Derivatives Clearinghouse

  Staff Working Paper 2016-4 Radoslav Raykov

  This paper studies how the allocation of residual losses affects trading and welfare in a central counterparty. I compare loss sharing under two loss-allocation mechanisms – variation margin haircutting and cash calls – and study the privately and socially optimal degree of loss sharing.

  Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Topic(s): Economic models, Payment clearing and settlement systems JEL Code(s): G, G1, G19, G2, G21

• Optimal Margining and Margin Relief in Centrally Cleared Derivatives Markets

  Staff Working Paper 2014-29 Radoslav Raykov

  A major policy challenge posed by derivatives clearinghouses is that their collateral requirements can rise sharply in times of stress, reducing market liquidity and further exacerbating downturns.

  Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Topic(s): Economic models, Payment clearing and settlement systems JEL Code(s): G, G1, G19, G2, G21