Erhao Xie - Bank Publications

• Testing Collusion and Cooperation in Binary Choice Games

  Staff Working Paper 2023-58 Erhao Xie

  This paper studies the testable implication of players’ collusive or cooperative behaviour in a binary choice game with complete information. I illustrate the implementation of this test by revisiting the entry game between Walmart and Kmart.

  Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Topic(s): Econometric and statistical methods, Market structure and pricing JEL Code(s): C, C5, C57, L, L1, L13

• Nonparametric Identification of Incomplete Information Discrete Games with Non-equilibrium Behaviors

  Staff Working Paper 2022-22 Erhao Xie

  This paper jointly relaxes two assumptions in the literature that estimates games. These two assumptions are the parametric restriction on the model primitives and the restriction of equilibrium behaviors. Without imposing the above two assumptions, this paper identifies the primitives of the game.

  Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Topic(s): Econometric and statistical methods JEL Code(s): C, C5, C57

• Monetary Payoff and Utility Function in Adaptive Learning Models

  Staff Working Paper 2019-50 Erhao Xie

  When players repeatedly face an identical or similar game (e.g., coordination game, technology adoption game, or product choice game), they may learn through experience to perform better in the future. This learning behaviour has important economic implications.

  Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Topic(s): Econometric and statistical methods, Economic models JEL Code(s): C, C5, C57, C7, C72, C9, C92

• Inference in Games Without Nash Equilibrium: An Application to Restaurants’ Competition in Opening Hours

  Staff Working Paper 2018-60 Erhao Xie

  This paper relaxes the Bayesian Nash equilibrium (BNE) assumption commonly imposed in empirical discrete choice games with incomplete information. Instead of assuming that players have unbiased/correct expectations, my model treats a player’s belief about the behavior of other players as an unrestricted unknown function. I study the joint identification of belief and payoff functions.

  Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Topic(s): Econometric and statistical methods, Market structure and pricing JEL Code(s): C, C5, C57, L, L1, L13, L8, L85