L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets

• Information Sharing and Bargaining in Buyer-Seller Networks

  Staff working paper 2016-63 Sofia Priazhkina, Frank H. Page

  This paper presents a model of strategic buyer-seller networks with information exchange between sellers. Prior to engaging in bargaining with buyers, sellers can share access to buyers for a negotiated transfer. We study how this information exchange affects overall market prices, volumes and welfare, given different initial market conditions and information sharing rules.

  Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers JEL Code(s): C, C7, C71, C78, D, D2, D21, D4, D43, D8, D85, L, L1, L13 Research Theme(s): Financial markets and funds management, Market functioning, Market structure

• Bank Screening Heterogeneity

  Staff working paper 2016-56 Thibaut Duprey

  Production efficiency and financial stability do not necessarily go hand in hand. With heterogeneity in banks’ abilities to screen borrowers, the market for loans becomes segmented and a self-competition mechanism arises. When heterogeneity increases, the intensive and extensive margins have opposite effects.

  Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers JEL Code(s): G, G1, G14, G2, G21, L, L1, L13 Research Theme(s): Financial system, Financial institutions and intermediation, Financial stability and systemic risk, Household and business credit
• November 14, 2013

  Fragmentation in Canadian Equity Markets

  Bank of Canada Review - Autumn 2013 Corey Garriott, Anna Pomeranets, Joshua Slive, Thomas Thorn

  Changes in technology and regulation have resulted in an increasing number of trading venues in equity markets in Canada. New trading platforms have intensified price competition and have encouraged innovation, and they do not appear to have segmented trade. But the increasingly complex market structure has necessitated investments in expensive technology and has introduced new operational risks. Regulatory responses should be carefully adapted to retain the competition and innovation associated with this market fragmentation.

  Content Type(s): Publications, Bank of Canada Review articles JEL Code(s): G, G2, L, L1, L13, N, N2, N22
• November 15, 2012

  Access, Competition and Risk in Centrally Cleared Markets

  Bank of Canada Review - Autumn 2012 Jean-Sébastien Fontaine, Héctor Pérez Saiz, Joshua Slive

  Central counterparties can make over-the-counter markets more resilient and reduce systemic risk by mitigating and managing counterparty credit risk. These benefits are maximized when access to central counterparties is available to a wide range of market participants. In an over-the-counter market, there is an important trade-off between risk and competition. A model of an over-the-counter market shows how risk and competition could be influenced by the incentives of market participants as they move to central clearing. In a centrally cleared market, there may be less risk when participation is high. This helps to explain why regulators have put in place requirements for fair, open and risk-based access criteria.

  Content Type(s): Publications, Bank of Canada Review articles JEL Code(s): G, G1, G18, G2, G21, L, L1, L13