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We find that the rise in Government of Canada debt issuance correlates to growing participation of hedge funds in bond auctions since 2020. This increased participation supports the cost-effective distribution of Canada’s debt, but it also represents a potential vulnerability because hedge funds have a greater flight risk than other investor types.

This paper studies the rapid increase since 2019 of Government of Canada (GoC) debt issuance alongside greater hedge fund participation at GoC bond auctions. We find a systematic relationship between GoC debt stock and hedge fund bidding shares at auction.

This paper theoretically and empirically examines the price impacts of liquidations in DeFi and how different liquidation mechanisms affect the price impacts.

This paper introduces and estimates a structural model of the Canadian primary market for government debt. We assess the role of dealer exit in this market as a key reason for increased, yet irregular, customer entry and quantify the benefits of greater customer competition against the costs of higher market volatility.

We examine how intermediary capitalization affects asset prices in a framework that allows for intermediary market power. We introduce a model in which capital-constrained intermediaries buy or trade an asset in an imperfectly competitive market, and we show that weaker capital constraints lead to both higher prices and intermediary markups.

We use bid data from Government of Canada bond auctions between 1999 and 2021 to gauge the yield sensitivity of these bonds to the issuance amount. Our new metric estimates the demand function of the bidders at each auction and offers insights into the relationship between supply and yield of government bonds.

The main objectives of debt management are to raise stable and low-cost funding to meet the government’s financial needs and to maintain a well-functioning market for government securities.

Bank resolution is costly. In the United States, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) typically resolves failing banks by auction.

This note examines the costs of the Government of Canada bond buyback and switch programs between 1998 and 2016. Our analysis indicates that the auction design of the buyback program was effective in retiring government debt with minimal costs resulting from bid shading in auctions and price impact.

This paper shows point identification in first-price auction models with risk aversion and unobserved auction heterogeneity by exploiting multiple bids from each auction and variation in the number of bidders. The required exclusion restriction is shown to be consistent with a large class of entry models.