Time-Inconsistent Manager Incentives and Capital Formation Staff working paper 2026-25 José-Víctor Ríos-Rull, Josef Schroth, Tamon Takamura, Yaz Terajima In a dynamic model with limited commitment, aggregate payout-based compensation induces managers to raise outside equity yet invest too little today. Per-share compensation eliminates the dilution motive and restores efficient investment, but it does so through slower capital accumulation that better protects incumbent shareholder value. Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers JEL Code(s): G, G3, G32, G34, J, J3, J33 Research Theme(s): Financial markets and funds management, Market functioning, Models and tools, Economic models
Market Concentration and Uniform Pricing: Evidence from Bank Mergers Staff working paper 2021-9 João Granja, Nuno Paixão We show that US banks price deposits almost uniformly across their branches and that this pricing practice is more important than increases in local market concentration in explaining the deposit rate dynamics following bank mergers. Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers JEL Code(s): D, D4, G, G2, G20, G21, G28, G3, G34, L, L1, L11 Research Theme(s): Financial markets and funds management, Market structure, Financial system, Financial institutions and intermediation, Financial stability and systemic risk
Outside Investor Access to Top Management: Market Monitoring versus Stock Price Manipulation Staff working paper 2020-43 Josef Schroth Should managers be paid in stock options if they provide stock-market participants with information about the firm? This paper studies how firm owners trade off the benefit of stock-price incentives and better-informed market participants against the cost of potential stock-price manipulation. Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers JEL Code(s): D, D8, D82, D86, G, G1, G14, G3, G32, G34, M, M1, M12, M4, M41 Research Theme(s): Financial markets and funds management, Market functioning, Financial system, Financial institutions and intermediation