Josef Schroth is a Research Advisor in the Financial Stability Department at the Bank of Canada. He works in the areas of macroeconomics and accounting. Specific topics include financial market regulation and disclosure choice. Josef Schroth received his PhD in economics from UCLA.
In a dynamic model with limited commitment, aggregate payout-based compensation induces managers to raise outside equity yet invest too little today. Per-share compensation eliminates the dilution motive and restores efficient investment, but it does so through slower capital accumulation that better protects incumbent shareholder value.
When a bank holds a lot of safe assets, it is well situated to deal with funding stress. But when all banks hold a lot of safe assets, a pecuniary externality implies that their (wholesale) funding costs increase. This reduces banks’ ability to hold capital buffers and thus, paradoxically, increases the frequency of funding stress.
Time-varying capital buffer requirements are a powerful tool that allow bank regulators to avoid severe financial stress without the cost of imposing very high levels of capital. However, this tool is only effective if banks understand how it is used. I present a model that banks and financial market participants can use to anticipate how time-varying capital buffer requirements change over time.
A regulator would want to restrict dividends to force banks to rebuild capital during a crisis. But such a policy is not time-consistent. A time-consistent policy would let banks gradually rebuild capital and pay dividends even when their equity remains below pre-crisis levels.
Countercyclical capital buffers are regulatory measures developed in response to the global financial crisis of 2008–09. This note focuses on how time-varying capital buffers can improve financial stability in Canada
Optimal coordination of monetary and macroprudential policies implies higher risk weights on (safe) bonds any time that banks are required to hold additional capital buffers. Coordination also implies a somewhat tighter monetary-policy stance whenever such capital buffers are released.
