D44 - Auctions
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Resolving Failed Banks: Uncertainty, Multiple Bidding & Auction Design
Bank resolution is costly. In the United States, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) typically resolves failing banks by auction. -
The Cost of the Government Bond Buyback and Switch Programs in Canada
This note examines the costs of the Government of Canada bond buyback and switch programs between 1998 and 2016. Our analysis indicates that the auction design of the buyback program was effective in retiring government debt with minimal costs resulting from bid shading in auctions and price impact. -
Identification and Estimation of Risk Aversion in First-Price Auctions with Unobserved Auction Heterogeneity
This paper shows point identification in first-price auction models with risk aversion and unobserved auction heterogeneity by exploiting multiple bids from each auction and variation in the number of bidders. The required exclusion restriction is shown to be consistent with a large class of entry models. -
Comparison of Auction Formats in Canadian Government Auctions
Using a rich sample of Canadian government securities auctions, we estimate the structural parameters of a share-auction model accounting for asymmetries across bidders. We find little evidence of asymmetries between participants at Canadian government nominal bond auctions.