D44 - Auctions

• Maturity Composition and the Demand for Government Debt

  Staff Working Paper 2020-29 Jason Allen, Jakub Kastl, Milena Wittwer

  The main objectives of debt management are to raise stable and low-cost funding to meet the government’s financial needs and to maintain a well-functioning market for government securities.

  Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Topic(s): Debt management, Financial markets JEL Code(s): C, C1, C14, D, D4, D44, E, E5, E58, G, G1, G12

• Resolving Failed Banks: Uncertainty, Multiple Bidding & Auction Design

  Staff Working Paper 2019-30 Jason Allen, Robert Clark, Brent Hickman, Eric Richert

  Bank resolution is costly. In the United States, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) typically resolves failing banks by auction.

  Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Topic(s): Econometric and statistical methods, Financial institutions JEL Code(s): C, C5, C57, D, D4, D44, G, G2, G21

• The Cost of the Government Bond Buyback and Switch Programs in Canada

  Staff Analytical Note 2018-41 Bo Young Chang, Jun Yang, Parker Liu

  This note examines the costs of the Government of Canada bond buyback and switch programs between 1998 and 2016. Our analysis indicates that the auction design of the buyback program was effective in retiring government debt with minimal costs resulting from bid shading in auctions and price impact.

  Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff analytical notes Topic(s): Debt management JEL Code(s): D, D4, D44

• Identification and Estimation of Risk Aversion in First-Price Auctions with Unobserved Auction Heterogeneity

  Staff Working Paper 2016-23 Serafin Grundl, Yu Zhu

  This paper shows point identification in first-price auction models with risk aversion and unobserved auction heterogeneity by exploiting multiple bids from each auction and variation in the number of bidders. The required exclusion restriction is shown to be consistent with a large class of entry models.

  Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Topic(s): Econometric and statistical methods JEL Code(s): C, C1, C14, C5, C57, D, D4, D44, L, L0, L00

• Comparison of Auction Formats in Canadian Government Auctions

  Staff Working Paper 2009-5 Olivier Armantier, Nourredine Lafhel

  Using a rich sample of Canadian government securities auctions, we estimate the structural parameters of a share-auction model accounting for asymmetries across bidders. We find little evidence of asymmetries between participants at Canadian government nominal bond auctions.

  Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Topic(s): Debt management, Financial markets, Market structure and pricing JEL Code(s): D, D4, D44, D6, D63, G, G2, G28