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This analytical paper examines the organization of Government of Canada bond dealing. We focus on dealers’ hedging and funding practices, the market infrastructures that support those practices, and trading costs across the yield curve. This paper builds on earlier work discussing Canada’s fixed-income market: "Government of Canada Fixed-Income Market Ecology."

We develop an approach to quantify transaction costs in the repo market using OTC transaction data, where quoted bid-ask spreads are not observable. By estimating effective spreads at the level of individual trades, we construct a novel metric to evaluate intermediation costs across different segments of the market.

This paper examines the interaction between quantitative easing (QE) and the securities lending facility (SLF) using a detailed dataset on Riksbank QE purchases, Swedish DMO SLF transactions and OTC repo deals. A theoretical model further shows how excess demand for assets and search frictions shift the SLF from a backstop to a first-resort tool.

We study household mortgage choice in a model with three mortgage contracts that differ in their payment structures: fixed-rate fixed-payment, variable-rate variable-payment, and a hybrid variable-rate fixed-payment mortgage where interest rate changes affect principal repayment rather than payment size. We calibrate the model to match mortgage choice patterns in Canada, where all these options are offered with short terms. We demonstrate that restricting contract choice or mandating long terms, as in the U.S. system, can lead to substantial welfare losses by limiting risk management strategies and increasing mortgage pricing ex-ante.

Hedge funds are active in Canadian government bond markets and help improve market efficiency. But their trading strategies are not well understood. We offer insights into the range of strategies hedge funds use beyond the more commonly known cash-futures basis trade. We also explore the concentration of trading activity among a few large funds.

We explore how many electronic funds transfer (EFT) systems can viably coexist within a jurisdiction at efficient scale by estimating the cost curve of the average EFT. We estimate the marginal cost to be approximately $0.55 per transaction, and the fixed cost to be approximately $83 million per year.

When a bank holds a lot of safe assets, it is well situated to deal with funding stress. But when all banks hold a lot of safe assets, a pecuniary externality implies that their (wholesale) funding costs increase. This reduces banks’ ability to hold capital buffers and thus, paradoxically, increases the frequency of funding stress.

Time-varying capital buffer requirements are a powerful tool that allow bank regulators to avoid severe financial stress without the cost of imposing very high levels of capital. However, this tool is only effective if banks understand how it is used. I present a model that banks and financial market participants can use to anticipate how time-varying capital buffer requirements change over time.

In 2024, the Canadian Overnight Repo Rate Average (CORRA) rose 7 basis points above the Bank of Canada’s target overnight rate as settlement balances declined and hedge fund borrowing increased by $30 billion, straining dealers’ balance sheets. Exercising market power, dealers raised rates, and as client activity grew, these higher rates increasingly influenced CORRAs deviation from target.

I study the links between Canadian banks and non-bank financial intermediaries (NBFIs) by observing co-movements in stock prices. Perceived interconnections increased before the COVID-19 pandemic but have since stabilized, with the strongest ties seen between large banks and NBFIs. The secured credit line extended to Home Trust, a non-bank mortgage lender that experienced severe funding stress in 2017, significantly reduced banks' risk exposure to NBFIs during this episode.