Héctor Pérez Saiz

Author

Staff research

Geographical and Cultural Proximity in Retail Banking

Staff working paper 2023-2 Santiago Carbo-Valverde, Héctor Pérez Saiz, Hongyu Xiao
This paper measures how both geographical and cultural proximity of bank branches affect household credit choice and pricing. For credit products that require high levels of ex-ante screening, we find that both proximities can complement each other in reducing the cost of providing soft information, thereby increasing credit access.
Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers JEL Code(s): D, D8, D82, D83, G, G2, G20, G21, R, R2, R22, Z, Z1, Z10, Z13 Research Theme(s): Financial markets and funds management, Market functioning, Financial system, Financial institutions and intermediation, Household and business credit, Monetary policy, Real economy and forecasting

A Calibrated Model of Intraday Settlement

Staff discussion paper 2018-3 Héctor Pérez Saiz, Siddharth Untawala, Gabriel Xerri
This paper estimates potential exposures, netting benefits and settlement gains by merging retail and wholesale payments into batches and conducting multiple intraday settlements in this hypothetical model of a single "calibrated payments system." The results demonstrate that credit risk exposures faced by participants in the system are largely dependent on their relative activity in the retail and wholesale payments systems.
Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff discussion papers JEL Code(s): C, C5, C58, G, G2, G21, G23 Research Theme(s): Financial system, Financial stability and systemic risk, Models and tools, Econometric, statistical and computational methods, Money and payments, Payment and financial market infrastructures

Tail Risk in a Retail Payment System: An Extreme-Value Approach

Staff discussion paper 2018-2 Héctor Pérez Saiz, Blair Williams, Gabriel Xerri
The increasing importance of risk management in payment systems has led to the development of an array of sophisticated tools designed to mitigate tail risk in these systems. In this paper, we use extreme value theory methods to quantify the level of tail risk in the Canadian retail payment system (ACSS) for the period from 2002 to 2015.
Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff discussion papers JEL Code(s): C, C5, C58, G, G2, G21, G23 Research Theme(s): Financial system, Financial stability and systemic risk, Models and tools, Econometric, statistical and computational methods, Money and payments, Payment and financial market infrastructures

Credit Risk and Collateral Demand in a Retail Payment System

Staff discussion paper 2016-16 Héctor Pérez Saiz, Gabriel Xerri
The recent financial crisis has led to the development of new regulations to control risk in designated payment systems, and the implementation of new credit risk management standards is one of the key issues. In this paper, we study various credit risk management schemes for the Canadian retail payment system (ACSS) that are designed to cover the exposure of a defaulting member.
Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff discussion papers JEL Code(s): C, C5, C58, G, G2, G21, G23 Research Theme(s): Financial system, Financial stability and systemic risk, Models and tools, Econometric, statistical and computational methods, Money and payments, Payment and financial market infrastructures, Retail payments

Measuring Systemic Risk Across Financial Market Infrastructures

Staff working paper 2016-10 Fuchun Li, Héctor Pérez Saiz
We measure systemic risk in the network of financial market infrastructures (FMIs) as the probability that two or more FMIs have a large credit risk exposure to the same FMI participant.
Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers JEL Code(s): C, C5, C58, G, G2, G21, G23 Research Theme(s): Financial system, Financial stability and systemic risk, Models and tools, Econometric, statistical and computational methods, Money and payments, Payment and financial market infrastructures

See More

Bank publications

Bank of Canada Review articles

November 15, 2012

Access, Competition and Risk in Centrally Cleared Markets

Bank of Canada Review - Autumn 2012 Jean-Sébastien Fontaine, Héctor Pérez Saiz, Joshua Slive

Central counterparties can make over-the-counter markets more resilient and reduce systemic risk by mitigating and managing counterparty credit risk. These benefits are maximized when access to central counterparties is available to a wide range of market participants. In an over-the-counter market, there is an important trade-off between risk and competition. A model of an over-the-counter market shows how risk and competition could be influenced by the incentives of market participants as they move to central clearing. In a centrally cleared market, there may be less risk when participation is high. This helps to explain why regulators have put in place requirements for fair, open and risk-based access criteria.

Content Type(s): Publications, Bank of Canada Review articles JEL Code(s): G, G1, G18, G2, G21, L, L1, L13

See More