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April 25, 2012

Opening Statement before the Senate Standing Committee on Banking, Trade and Commerce

Opening statement Mark Carney Senate Standing Committee on Banking, Trade and Commerce Ottawa, Ontario
Good afternoon. Tiff and I are pleased to be here with you today to discuss the April Monetary Policy Report, which the Bank published last week. The profile for global economic growth has improved since the Bank released its January MPR. Europe is expected to emerge slowly from recession in the second half of 2012, […]

Occasionally Binding Constraints in Large Models: A Review of Solution Methods

Staff discussion paper 2021-5 Jonathan Swarbrick
Solving macroeconomic models is difficult. One challenge is the occasionally binding constraint of the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates. This paper reviews various ways to solve models that include this feature.

CBDC: Banking and Anonymity

Staff working paper 2024-9 Yuteng Cheng, Ryuichiro Izumi
We examine the optimal amount of user anonymity in a central bank digital currency in the context of bank lending. Anonymity, defined as the lender’s inability to discern an entrepreneur’s actions that enable fund diversion, influences the choice of payment instrument due to its impact on a bank’s lending decisions.
October 27, 2010

Opening Statement before the Standing Senate Committee on Banking, Trade and Commerce

Opening statement Mark Carney Standing Senate Committee on Banking, Trade and Commerce Ottawa, Ontario
We are pleased to appear before this committee today to discuss the Bank of Canada’s views on the economy and our monetary policy stance. Before I take your questions, I would like to give you some of the highlights from our latest Monetary Policy Report, which was released last week.

Public vs. Private Payment Platforms: Market Impacts and Optimal Policy

Staff working paper 2026-10 Youming Liu, Francisco Rivadeneyra, Edona Reshidi
We study the competition between a welfare-maximizing public payment platform (e.g., CBDC or fast payment system) and a profit-maximizing private platform in a two-sided market, deriving optimal public pricing and showing how network effects, fragmentation, and policy mandates like zero fees or cost recovery shape welfare, usage, and fee incidence.
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