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This article explores the role of inflation expectations in the conduct of monetary policy. It reviews the various measures of inflation expectations used by central banks, including surveys and market-based indicators, and considers their advantages and disadvantages. It examines the critical role of inflation expectations in the framework that central banks use to understand, forecast, and control inflation. It also looks at their role as an indicator of central bank credibility. The behaviour of inflation expectations over the past two years is analyzed and policy conclusions are offered.

Using the Bank of Canada's main projection and policy-analysis model, ToTEM, this paper measures the welfare gains of switching from inflation targeting to price-level targeting under imperfect credibility. Following the policy change, private agents assign a probability to the event that the policy-maker will revert to inflation-targeting next period.

Although the concept of monetary policy lag has historical roots deep in the monetary economics literature, relatively little attention has been paid to the idea. In this paper, we build on Svensson's (1997) inflation targeting framework by explicitly taking into account the lagged effect of monetary policy and characterize the optimal monetary policy reaction function both in the absence and in the presence of the zero lower bound on the nominal interest rate.

The authors present a detailed discussion of the Bank of Canada's framework for the implementation of monetary policy. As background, they provide a brief overview of the financial system in Canada, including a discussion of the financial services industry and the money market.

One of the most important factors that must be considered if countries are thinking about lowering the target level of inflation much below 2 per cent is the zero interest bound. Targeting inflation rates that are too low, the authors note, may restrict the ability of monetary policy to respond to economic shocks by limiting the amount by which interest rates can be eased.

Since 1997 when the Bank of Canada last published a review of the Canadian overnight market, several important changes have affected the market's structure and dynamics. Reid provides a current overview of the market, examining the financial instruments, market transparency and flows, and the collateralized overnight rate as it has evolved since the introduction of the Large Value Transfer System and the fixed announcement dates. Other significant influences include changes in market practices regarding risk management, the rise of securities lending, the increased demand for collateral, and the Bank of Canada's measures to reinforce the target for the overnight rate.

This paper uses real-time briefing forecasts prepared for the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) to provide estimates of historical changes in the design of U.S. monetary policy and in the implied central-bank target for inflation. Empirical results support a description of policy with an effective inflation target of roughly 7 percent in the 1970s.

Operational events in the Large Value Transfer System (LVTS) almost always result in a disturbance of the regular flow of payments.

In the United States, the Federal Reserve has a dual mandate of promoting stable inflation and maximum employment. Since the Fed directly controls only one instrument - the federal funds rate - the authors argue that the Fed's priorities continuously alternate between inflation and economic activity.

When the Bank of Canada was first established in 1935, it had two very different models to choose from—the Bank of England and the U.S. Federal Reserve—in terms of the instruments that it might use for implementing monetary policy. Although some aspects of the Bank's early monetary policy practices, including the role of discount facilities and moral suasion, reflect the British example, other important differences shaped a distinctly Canadian approach. Chant describes what he argues are distinctively Canadian innovations: the Bank's favoured means of managing chartered bank liquidity through transfers of government deposits, the adoption of lagged reserve requirements, and the two periods in which it decided to float the Bank Rate. He also describes the series of bold initiatives that were undertaken in the 1990s with regard to simplifying clearing and settlement procedures, reducing reserve requirements, and setting the Bank's target for the overnight rate. Chant suggests that these changes have improved market efficiency, reduced risk and uncertainty, and strengthened the Bank's influence over its short-term operating target.