Jabir Sandhu is a Principal Economist in the Financial Markets Department at the Bank of Canada. His primary research interests include liquidity in fixed-income markets and asset management. He received his Master of Financial Risk Management from the University of Toronto’s Rotman School of Management.
We investigate whether hedge funds contributed to Government of Canada bond market illiquidity at the onset of the Middle East war in early 2026. We find no evidence they did. Hedge funds remained active in primary auctions, while their secondary market trading remained broadly consistent with their usual relative-value strategies.
We show that haircuts are rarely used in the Canadian dealer-to-client repo market and their usage did not increase materially during past stress events. Usage is concentrated among wealth managers and some foreign official institutions, likely reflecting regulatory or internal requirements.
We examine the Canadian money market fund (MMF) sector and find that it has grown rapidly, holding a large share of treasury bills and commercial paper. Unlike in some other jurisdictions where investor outflows likely amplified stresses, Canadian MMFs experienced inflows during the March 2020 market turmoil.
We consider ways central banks could adapt in the event of an increased risk of a dash for cash from asset managers. We explore ideas such as new facilities that ease asset managers’ ability to convert existing assets to cash or new assets with liquidity that central banks would guarantee.
We find that foreign central banks own a large share of Government of Canada (GoC) bonds and tend to hold their positions for longer than other types of asset managers. This buy-and-hold behaviour could offer benefits. For example, foreign central banks may be less likely than other asset managers to sell bonds and add to strains on market liquidity in periods of turmoil. However, foreign central banks’ buy-and-hold behaviour combined with their minimal lending of GoC bonds in securities-financing markets, as observed in our available data, can potentially lower liquidity because fewer GoC bonds are available for others to transact in secondary markets. Indeed, we find that higher levels of foreign central banks’ GoC bond holdings are related to lower liquidity.
We find that on any given day, nearly half of Government of Canada bond transactions by clients of dealers can be offset with other clients, including during the turmoil in March 2020. Our results show that under certain conditions clients could potentially trade directly with each other and are a step towards understanding the relevance of broader all-to-all trading in the Government of Canada bond market.
We consider ways central banks could adapt in the event of an increased risk of a dash for cash from asset managers. We explore ideas such as new facilities that ease asset managers’ ability to convert existing assets to cash or new assets with liquidity that central banks would guarantee.
