Consumer Credit with Over-optimistic Borrowers Staff working paper 2020-57 Florian Exler, Igor Livshits, James (Jim) C. MacGee, Michèle Tertilt When lenders cannot directly identify behavioural and rational borrowers, they use type scoring to track the likelihood of a borrower’s type. This leads to the partial pooling of borrowers, which results in rational borrowers subsidizing borrowing costs for behavioural borrowers. This, in turn, reduces the effectiveness of regulatory policies that target mistakes by behavioural borrowers. Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers JEL Code(s): E, E2, E21, E4, E49, G, G1, G18, K, K3, K35 Research Theme(s): Financial system, Financial stability and systemic risk, Financial system regulation and oversight, Household and business credit, Monetary policy, Monetary policy framework and transmission