Antoine Camous

Author

Staff research

The Central Bank Strikes Back! Credibility of Monetary Policy under Fiscal Influence

Staff working paper 2022-11 Antoine Camous, Dmitry Matveev
Central banks in many advanced economies enjoy a high degree of independence, which protects monetary policy decisions from political influence. But how should independent central banks react if pressured by fiscal policy-makers? We examine whether a central bank should design a monetary policy framework that prescribes acting conditionally on how fiscal policy behaves.
Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers JEL Code(s): E, E0, E02, E5, E52, E58, E6, E61, E62 Research Theme(s): Financial system, Financial stability and systemic risk, Monetary policy, Inflation dynamics and pressures, Monetary policy framework and transmission, Monetary policy tools and implementation

Furor over the Fed : Presidential Tweets and Central Bank Independence

Staff analytical note 2019-33 Antoine Camous, Dmitry Matveev
We illustrate how market data can be informative about the interactions between monetary and fiscal policy. Federal funds futures are private contracts that reflect investor’s expectations about monetary policy decisions.
Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff analytical notes JEL Code(s): E, E4, E44, E5, E52, E58 Research Theme(s): Financial markets and funds management, Market functioning, Financial system, Financial stability and systemic risk, Monetary policy, Monetary policy framework and transmission

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