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729 Results

Credit in a Tiered Payments System

Staff Working Paper 2006-36 Alexandra Lai, Nikil Chande, Sean O'Connor
Payments systems are typically characterized by some degree of tiering, with upstream firms (clearing agents) providing settlement accounts to downstream institutions that wish to clear and settle payments indirectly in these systems (indirect clearers).

Estimation of the Default Risk of Publicly Traded Canadian Companies

Two models of default risk are prominent in the financial literature: Merton's structural model and Altman's non-structural model.

Can Affine Term Structure Models Help Us Predict Exchange Rates?

Staff Working Paper 2006-27 Antonio Diez de los Rios
The author proposes an arbitrage-free model of the joint behaviour of interest and exchange rates whose exchange rate forecasts outperform those produced by a random-walk model, a vector autoregression on the forward premiums and the rate of depreciation, and the standard forward premium regression.

Examining the Trade-Off between Settlement Delay and Intraday Liquidity in Canada's LVTS: A Simulation Approach

Staff Working Paper 2006-20 Neville Arjani
The author explores a fundamental trade-off that occurs between settlement delay and intraday liquidity in the daily operation of large-value payment systems (LVPS), with specific application to Canada's Large Value Transfer System (LVTS).

Risk-Cost Frontier and Collateral Valuation in Securities Settlement Systems for Extreme Market Events

Staff Working Paper 2006-17 Alejandro García, Ramazan Gençay
The authors examine how the use of extreme value theory yields collateral requirements that are robust to extreme fluctuations in the market price of the asset used as collateral.

Ownership Concentration and Competition in Banking Markets

Staff Working Paper 2006-7 Alexandra Lai, Raphael Solomon
Many countries prohibit large shareholdings in their domestic banks.The authors examine whether such a restriction restrains competition in a duopolistic loan market. Blockholders may influence managers' output decisions by choosing capital structure, as in Brander and Lewis (1986).
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