The Effect of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act on CEO Pay for Luck Staff Working Paper 2008-20 Teodora Paligorova According to the rent-extraction hypothesis, weak corporate governance allows entrenched CEOs to capture the pay-setting process and benefit from events outside of their control – get paid for luck. Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Topic(s): Labour markets JEL Code(s): G, G3, G38, J, J3, J33, M, M5, M52
Implications of New Accounting Standards for the Bank of Canada's Balance Sheet Staff Discussion Paper 2007-2 Mark Zelmer, Grahame Johnson The Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants (CICA) has implemented new accounting standards for the valuation and reporting of financial instruments. They are effective for the Bank of Canada in 2007. As a result of these changes, the Bank has begun valuing its holdings of Government of Canada treasury bills on a fair value basis and […] Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff discussion papers Topic(s): Financial institutions, Monetary policy framework JEL Code(s): E, E5, E58, M, M4
Uninsured Idiosyncratic Production Risk with Borrowing Constraints Staff Working Paper 2005-26 Francisco Covas The author analyzes a general-equilibrium model of a heterogeneous agents economy in which the agents are subject to borrowing constraints and uninsurable idiosyncratic production risk. Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Topic(s): Economic models, Financial institutions, Financial markets JEL Code(s): E, E2, E22, G, G1, G11, M, M1, M13
Public Venture Capital and Entrepreneurship Staff Working Paper 2004-10 Oana Secrieru, Marianne Vigneault Entrepreneurship is a key factor in promoting growth in output and employment. Consequently, to encourage new start-ups, most governments in developed countries have public venture capital programs. Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Topic(s): Financial markets, Fiscal policy, Labour markets JEL Code(s): D, D2, G, G2, G24, G28, J, J2, J24, M, M1, M13