Information, Risk Sharing and Incentives in Agency Problems Staff Working Paper 2015-7 Jia Xie This paper studies the use of information for incentives and risk sharing in agency problems. When the principal is risk neutral or the outcome is contractible, risk sharing is unnecessary or completely taken care of by a contract on the outcome. Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Topic(s): Economic models JEL Code(s): D, D8
Immigrants and Mortgage Delinquency in the United States Staff Working Paper 2015-1 Zhenguo Lin, Yingchun Liu, Jia Xie We investigate the relationship between immigrant status and mortgage delinquency in the United States. Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Topic(s): Debt management, Financial stability JEL Code(s): G, G2, G21, J, J1, J15