Money for Nothing? A Central Banker’s Take on Cryptoassets

Carolyn A. Wilkins
Senior Deputy Governor
Bank of Canada
Princeton University
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“No mo fiat money/
we don’t do that/
Get urself some coins/
fo the banks, take ur stash”

“Bitcoin’s Here” by Zhou Tonged
(cover of Drake’s “Started From The Bottom”)
Why central banks care about cryptoassets

Central bank mandate

• Monetary policy
• Currency issuance
• Financial stability
Road map

1. The crypto landscape

2. Key questions for central banks (CBs)
   i. What’s fundamentally new here?
   ii. Could private cryptocurrencies enable a better monetary policy (MP) regime?
   iii. Should CBs issue their own digital currencies?

3. Bank of Canada experiments with distributed ledger technology (DLT)

➢ Conclusions and avenues for further research
1. The crypto landscape
Revolving door in crypto markets has become busier

Entry and exit of currencies trading on exchanges (weekly)

Entry  Exit
## Cryptoassets heterogeneous, but three main types

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Crypto-currencies</th>
<th>Generally intended for making purchases of goods, services</th>
<th>Bitcoin (as envisioned) Monero Impak Coin</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Security tokens</td>
<td>Allow buyers to take some sort of a position in a firm</td>
<td>DAO tokens</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Utility tokens</td>
<td>Enable the user to consume goods or services specific to a platform</td>
<td>Ether Tether?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Crypto “currencies” not very useful as money yet....
....but trading activity of token-based assets is rising

Trading volumes of cryptoassets and US municipal and corporate bonds (weekly)
2. **Key questions for CBs**

i.  What’s fundamentally new here?

ii. Could private cryptocurrencies enable a better MP regime?

iii. Should CBs issue their own digital currencies?
Innovation in payment methods has a long history
What DLT (aka blockchain) can deliver (1)

Record-keeping in a ledger
- Open or permission-based
- Time-stamped and organized in blocks
- Carries full history of transactions

Déjà vu
- Bookkeeping as far back as 5000 BC
- Double-entry bookkeeping emerged in 14th century
- Money is memory (Kocherlakota 1998, Townsend 1989)
What DLT (aka blockchain) can deliver (2)

**Distributed consensus mechanism**
- Transactions get on block by consensus among participants
- Consensus secured by cryptography and achieved by incentive structure, not trusted third party

**Consensus mechanism is novel**
- Can scale among strangers without recourse to central authority
- “Solves” the double-spending problem
- Supports integrity and resilience of the ledger
Blockchain potentially just a better mousetrap

Efficiency gains could be important
- Increased efficiency of ownership record-keeping
- ... but need interoperability, and ownership/smart contracts still need to be enforceable

Transparency could reduce asymmetric information
- Data more complete and more widely available
- ... but limited where there are monitoring costs, or “soft” information is important (ledgers likely to contain only “hard” information)
Blockchain only shifts the need for trust

The incentive structure for trust is not infallible
- 51% attacks by miners possible (Krypton, Coiledcoin)
- Incentive structure creates negative externalities
  (Chiu and Koeppel 2018, Abadi and Brunnermeier 2018)

Programmers have power; do they have responsibility?
- Need to trust that program delivers what is on the label
  (DAO error, recent bug in Bitcoin software)
- Do programmers (and miners) have fiduciary duty?
  (Walch forthcoming)

Solutions to this issue are not straightforward—trilemma
  (Abadi and Brunnermeier 2018)
Bitcoin ecosystem: trust and dependencies abound
Blockchain doesn’t eliminate network externalities

Market share of the most popular Bitcoin mining pools

Source: www.blockchain.com
2. Key questions for CBs

i. What’s fundamentally new here?

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Money growth by a rule – Déjà vu?

Bitcoin standard would be unstable, just as gold was

Targeting money growth has been tried—and abandoned
- Canada and United States, parts of 1970s and ’80s
- Money supply difficult to measure, as demand for money is unstable
Cannot control aggregate supply of money

Supply of bitcoins and market capitalization

- Supply of bitcoins
- Market cap. of all coins ex. Ripple/Ether (in bitcoin)
- Market cap. of all coins (in bitcoin)

US$ millions

2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
What does a central bank need to conduct domestic MP?

If cryptocurrency dominated:
  • Transmission of monetary policy would be weakened
  • Lender-of-last-resort operations would be much more difficult

National and private currencies can co-exist, although:
  • Coordination issues arise
  • Strong regulations required for trust and robustness
    ➢ Fung, Hendry and Weber 2017, “Canadian Bank Notes and Dominion Notes: Lessons for Digital Currencies”
2. **Key questions for CBs**

   i. What’s fundamentally new here?
   
   ii. Could private cryptocurrencies enable a better MP regime?
   
   iii. Should CBs issue their own digital currencies?
Should we care if cash disappears?

Maybe not, if private money is in sovereign currency:
- Could still conduct MP and LoLR operations
- Private sector money may be more innovative
- Could lower ELB (Rogoff 2016, *The Curse of Cash*)

Yet……
- Regular citizens will lose access to central bank money
- Commercial bank deposits are subject to default risk
- Many people still care about using cash (Riksbank 2018)
- E-money may not be a perfect cash substitute (Chiu and Wong 2014, “E-Money: Efficiency, Stability and Optimal Policy”)

Most important question: Is public outside money a public good?
Yes. Universal access to safe medium of exchange supports trust
Efficiency and competition in banking services

Bank notes foster competition in financial services

- Central bank digital currency (CBDC) would continue role of additional payment option and “riskless” store of value in a cashless world
- CBDC competition could support market discipline, leading to lower-cost, higher-quality bank services

An additional payment method could make the payments system more resilient to operational failures

- Caveat: not a substitute for bank notes in a cyber event

Bottom line: Case for CBDC stronger when there is market failure

Kahn, Rivadeneyra and Wong forthcoming, “E-Money and Payments Policy”
CBDC: Reasons to give a central bank pause

Potential for bank runs

- Interest-bearing CBDC would compete directly with commercial bank deposits, a very stable form of bank funding
- Easier run mechanism during a crisis (Bank of Canada, Bank for International Settlements, CPMI, others)

Reputational risk

- Problems with CBDC could be much bigger than counterfeit $100 bills
- Hackings could put all holdings at risk
- Vehicle for illicit transactions?
Policy and technical design aspects intertwined

Many parameters to determine, including:

- Privacy or anonymity?
- Account or token-based?
- Interest-bearing?
- Access?
3. Bank of Canada experiments with DLT
Looking under the hood of blockchain: Project Jasper

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phases 1–2</th>
<th>Interbank payments</th>
<th>Payments Canada, R3, Canada’s six biggest banks</th>
<th>Completed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Phase 3</td>
<td>Post-trade settlement of cash and securities transactions</td>
<td>Payments Canada, Toronto Stock Exchange</td>
<td>Completed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phase 4</td>
<td>Cross-border payments</td>
<td>Monetary Authority of Singapore, Bank of England, commercial banks</td>
<td>In progress</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Project Jasper Phases 1-2

Centralized: Permissioning Entry/Exit
- Request coins/Pledge collateral
- Redeem coins
- Issue coins
- Transfer coins

Decentralized Ledger
General lessons so far (Jasper 1–3):

1. **Centralization is still required**
2. **Cost-savings potential from back office and more assets on ledger**
3. **DLT for narrow scope only is unlikely to yield cost savings**
Jasper Phase 4 motivated by inefficiencies in cross-border payments
Conclusions and avenues for further research
Messages to highlight

Ironies abound in the crypto sphere
- *Decentralized* ‘solution’ is all about *centralization*
- Need for trust is not reduced, just shifted
- Money supply rule may turn out to be more Achilles heel than strong suit

Cryptoasset threat to financial system small, but growing
- Moving fast, and incentives point to trouble down the road

Answers to Central Bank Digital Currency questions will shape the future
- Implications for financial inclusion, privacy, access to safe asset
- Major commercial interests at stake
Ambitious questions for further study

Financial stability:
- What do cryptoassets mean for the charter value of banks?
- Would credible crypto or CBDC exacerbate bank runs, and to what degree?

Transmission mechanism of monetary policy:
- How might different types of money alter transmission in normal versus crisis times?
- Could CBDC blur lines between MP and fiscal policy? (e.g., differential interest rates)

Other policy issues:
- Would CBDC be used; how would adoption work in two-sided markets?
- What is the social value of privacy?
- Do we need CB outside (retail) money at all?
Digital Currencies and Fintech

Learn more about three areas of our ongoing work on digital currencies and financial technology (Fintech).

RESEARCH

Understanding the benefits and risks of digital currencies and electronic payments is important. This is because they could have an impact on our core central bank functions.

For the past few years, we have researched private and central bank digital currencies. More recently, we’ve been studying other uses of Distributed Ledger Technology (DLT).

Learn more about our fintech research

EXPERIMENTS AND PROJECTS

With many possible applications of DLT, we need to look at a range of questions. Test cases between authorities and the private sector can help deepen our understanding.

The Bank works with academics and the private sector to build and test this technology.

Learn more about our projects

COLLABORATION ON THE REGULATORY AGENDA

Managing the benefits and risks of financial technology through a global regulatory framework is essential.

The Bank of Canada contributes to this agenda through the Financial Stability Board, the Committee on Payments and Market Infrastructure, and the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision.

Learn more about this work

Speeches, Panels and Presentations

FinTech and the Transformation of Financial Services

Presentation by contagion A. Wilkins

Archived panel discussion at the International Monetary Fund (IMF)

Governor Poloz Discusses FinTech

Interviews and Public Appearances

Governor Poloz Speaks with CNBC about Digital Currencies

An interview with CNBC’s Karen Tso during the World Economic Forum Annual Meeting in Davos, Switzerland.

January 25, 2018
Background: Project Jasper Phase 3

Facilitated the integration of two separate settlement systems

- cash system
- equity system

Loose integration likely easier to achieve than full combination of the two systems into one