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Database of Sovereign Defaults, 2015

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The views expressed in this report are solely those of the authors. No responsibility for them should be attributed to the Bank of Canada.

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Abstract

Until recently, there have been few efforts to systematically measure and aggregate the nominal value of the different types of sovereign government debt in default. To help fill this gap, the Bank of Canada’s Credit Rating Assessment Group (CRAG) has developed a comprehensive database of sovereign defaults posted on the Bank of Canada’s website. Our database draws on previously published data sets compiled by various official and private sector sources. It combines elements of these, together with new information, to develop estimates of stocks of government obligations in default, including bonds and other marketable securities, bank loans, and official loans in default, valued in U.S. dollars, for the years 1975 to 2014 on both a country-by-country and a global basis. This update of CRAG’s database, and subsequent updates, will be useful to researchers analyzing the economic and financial effects of individual sovereign defaults and, importantly, the impact on global financial stability of episodes involving multiple sovereign defaults.

JEL classification: F34, G10, G14, G15
Bank classification: Debt management; Development economics; Financial stability; International financial markets

Résumé

Jusqu’à maintenant, peu d’efforts ont été consacrés à l’évaluation systématique des différents types de défauts souverains ainsi qu’au calcul de la valeur nominale globale des engagements à payer que ceux-ci représentent. Afin de remédier à cette lacune, le groupe chargé de la notation du crédit de la Banque du Canada a développé une base de données exhaustive de défauts souverains. Cette base repose sur l’exploitation et la compilation de données préalablement publiées par diverses sources, publiques et privées. De plus, elle contient de nouvelles données qui permettent d’estimer le montant total des prêts bancaires, des obligations et autres titres négociables, ainsi que des prêts officiels en situation de défaut, tous exprimés en dollars américains, pour la période allant de 1975 à 2014. Cette information est présentée à la fois sur une base désagrégée, c’est-à-dire pays par pays, et sur une base agrégée, c’est-à-dire à l’échelle mondiale. La base de données actualisée du Groupe chargé de la notation du crédit, ainsi que ses mises à jour ultérieures, sera utile aux chercheurs souhaitant analyser les effets économiques et financiers de la défaillance d’emprunteurs souverains spécifiques ainsi que l’incidence sur la stabilité financière mondiale de la survenue de multiples défauts souverains.

Classification JEL : F34, G10, G14, G15
Classification de la Banque : Gestion de la dette; Économie du développement; Stabilité financière; Marchés financiers internationaux
1. Introduction

Government debt defaults are a recurring feature of public finance. These defaults have typically involved low-income and emerging-market economies, although recent cases include advanced-economy sovereigns. As a result, there is a prolific literature analyzing various aspects of sovereign debt crises – notably the political and economic factors that drive defaults, their domestic economic and financial effects, and the global impact of episodes where multiple defaults are involved.

Even so, comprehensive data on sovereign defaults have been hard to come by. This reflects a number of factors. An important reason is that there is no single internationally recognized definition of what constitutes a sovereign default. As a result, standards used by government borrowers and their creditors to report defaults, if they report at all, differ, and information on the various types of defaulted debt must be mined from different sources. The Bank’s Credit Rating Assessment Group (CRAG) database helps fill these gaps through the compilation of a comprehensive country-by-country and global data set of government debt in default that applies a common standard for determining when defaults occur.

This report is organized as follows. We start by proposing a definition of when a sovereign default has occurred. We next describe the main components of the CRAG database. We highlight the sources we use to compile the data and, where applicable, the methods employed to develop estimates. We also score the reliability of default data for each country. We then provide a commentary looking at historical trends in the default data, which can deepen our understanding of the impact on global financial stability of individual and multiple cases of sovereign defaults. A final section offers some conclusions. An appendix provides additional information on the sources used for the country-by-country and aggregate data.

2. Determining Sovereign Defaults

Like other types of debt, sovereign debt – the term commonly used to denote debt issued by national governments and certain fiscally autonomous territories – is a contractual obligation. A failure to meet these contractual obligations to pay interest or principal on the due date on sovereign debt provides one clear-cut example of a default. Another example is a failure by a
government to honour debt it has lawfully guaranteed where there are clear provisions for the guarantor to make timely payment. That said, sovereign defaults are often not so explicit. Government responses to financial distress can take many forms. In some cases, it can be inferred that, even in the absence of an actual interruption of debt service, a default has effectively occurred because actions by the sovereign result in economic losses by creditors, which can vary widely.

Consistent with much of the literature on sovereign defaults (Cruces and Trebesch 2011), and the practice of credit-rating agencies (Beers and Chambers 2006), we consider that a default has occurred when debt service is not paid on the due date (or within a specified grace period), payments are not made within the time frame specified under a guarantee, or, absent an outright payment default, in any of the following circumstances where creditors incur material economic losses on the sovereign debt they hold:

- agreements between governments and creditors that reduce interest rates and/or extend maturities on outstanding debt;
- government exchange offers to creditors where existing debt is swapped for new debt on less-economic terms;
- government purchases of debt at substantial discounts to par;
- government redenomination of foreign currency debt into new local currency obligations on less-economic terms;
- swaps of sovereign debt for equity (usually relating to privatization programs) on less-economic terms; or,
- conversion of central bank notes into new currency of less-than-equivalent face value.

3. Features of the CRAG Sovereign Default Database

CRAG’s sovereign database – posted on the Bank’s website at http://www.bankofcanada.ca/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/crag-database-update-04-05-15.xlsx – tabulates data on debt owed to official and private creditors for all sovereign defaults that we have identified between the years

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1 Sovereign ratings assigned by credit-rating agencies typically assess the likelihood of timely payment of government and central bank bills, notes, bonds, and bank loans, not the likelihood of timely payment of loans contracted from the International Monetary Fund, the multilateral lending institutions, and other official creditors.
1975 and 2014. For each year, the data are compiled on a country-by-country basis by type of creditor and then aggregated to show global totals. All country and global data on debt in default are expressed in nominal U.S. dollars. Sovereigns in default at any point during the year, together with the amounts of debt affected, are shown in the annual totals. Anticipating future updates, the database also shows the date of the most recent revision.

For the May 2015 update, the main changes are: new data for four sovereigns (Equatorial Guinea, Hungary, Nauru and Syria) not previously included; the deletion of one sovereign (Latvia), reflecting updated data indicating the historical absence of loans arrears; revised country and aggregate default data for 2013 and previous years, and, where available, for 2014; new country and aggregated data on World Bank loans in default for 2000–14 shown as a separate category; new country and aggregate data on Paris Club debt restructurings for 1975–2014 shown as a separate category; and, for a number of sovereigns, inclusion of additional data on debt writeoffs.

Within the country and global totals, debt in one or more of the following creditor subcategories is included:

- International Monetary Fund (IMF);
- International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank);
- Paris Club;
- other official creditors;
- private creditors;
- foreign currency bank loans;
- foreign currency bonds; and,
- local currency debt.

In addition to the country-by-country components, in most cases the database contains the following aggregate data for the period starting in 1975 to 2014:

2 The CRAG database is distinct from and complements the data sets measuring the nominal value of sovereign debt restructuring agreements and creditor losses involving private creditors and Paris Club official creditors published by Cruces and Trebesch (2011) and Das, Papaioannou and Trebesch (2012), respectively.
• total debt in default (in nominal U.S. dollars);
• total debt in default by creditor type (in nominal U.S. dollars);
• number of sovereign governments;
• number of sovereign governments in default;
• outstanding Paris Club debt (in nominal U.S. dollars);
• global general government or public debt (in nominal U.S. dollars); and,
• global gross domestic product (in nominal U.S. dollars).

4. Data Sources and Data Estimation

To construct the CRAG database, we utilized data previously published by the Asian Development Bank (2014 and earlier years); the Paris Club (2015); the International Monetary Fund (2014 and earlier years); the World Bank’s Annual Financial Statements (2014 and earlier years); the World Bank’s World DataBank (2015); Tweedie, Hagan and Tiwari (2012); Das, Papaioannou and Trebesch (2012); Cruces and Trebesch (2011); Beers and Chambers (2006); and Suter (1992). We combined elements of these data sets, together with information from national governments and other sources, to develop our estimates of stocks of bank loans, bonds and other marketable securities, and other private creditor claims, and IMF, World Bank, Paris Club and other official loans in default for the years 1975 through 2014. A country-by-country list of sources for the data is provided in the appendix.

It is important to highlight that some of our country data are, in fact, estimated. As Cruces and Trebesch (2011) and others have noted, documenting which sovereigns have defaulted, the time frame of such defaults, and the amounts of debt affected can be challenging. This is particularly true for local currency defaults, which often are not acknowledged as such by the governments involved and which have been little studied in the literature. Even in the better-documented cases where defaults are resolved through a formal debt-restructuring process, different sources can, at times, provide contradictory information.

Consequently, while we have relied on sources we consider to be reliable, our database of sovereign defaults may not be exhaustive. Some defaults may have been overlooked. Estimates
of the U.S.-dollar amounts of debt involved, in particular, may be subject to revision. Additional information on defaults, as it becomes available, will be incorporated in future database updates. Any errors in the identification and estimation processes employed are, of course, the sole responsibility of the authors.

The methods we utilize to estimate values of different types of defaulted debt are outlined below:

**IMF lending.** This category refers to IMF loans to member governments and obligations to pay IMF membership quotas. The IMF does not report late payments as defaults because it is a preferred creditor – meaning that generally it is paid ahead of other types of creditors and, when payments are late, expects ultimately to be repaid. There are cases where such arrears have persisted for extended periods. Also, some IMF loans to countries receiving official debt relief have been written off under the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI). Our sources on payment arrears are IMF annual reports, use of IMF credit as reported in the IMF’s *International Financial Statistics*, and reports by the IMF on cases of “protracted arrears.” Utilizing these data, and information on loan charges, we compute cumulative interest arrears and charges and apply them to the principal amount of loans and overdue quota amounts reported as being in arrears for at least six months. Since IMF lending is denominated in special drawing rights, we use applicable end-of-period exchange rates to convert amounts of estimated defaulted loans into U.S. dollars. Because MDRI-related loan writeoffs are funded by donor governments and do not impact the IMF’s balance sheet, they form one component of the other official creditor data category discussed below.

**MLI lending.** This category refers to loans by multilateral lending institutions (MLIs) to member governments. Many MLIs – all owned or controlled by groups of governments – have preferred creditor status, but like the IMF periodically have experienced late payments on their loans. Reporting practices on such loans vary, although the World Bank and the largest regional development banks publish reasonably comprehensive data on arrears of principal and interest when they persist for six months or more. In our 2015 database update, we publish World Bank data on the group’s loans in arrears for the years 2000–14. Our source is the World Bank’s annual financial statements. Apart from the World Bank data just noted, MLI lending, including
MDRI-related writeoffs, is one component of our proxy for other official debt in default described below.

**Paris Club lending.** This category refers to loans extended by the Paris Club, an informal group of bilateral official lenders, to other governments. Das, Papaioannou and Trebesch (2012) have published the most comprehensive data on sovereign debt restructurings involving the Paris Club for the years 1956–2010. These and more recent data are also available directly from the Paris Club’s website and show the year and the amounts of each restructuring of Paris Club debt. In some cases, amounts of restructured loans and debt service arrears are separately identified. However, the data do not include the annual amount of unpaid loans and accrued interest for the entire default period.

Based on these sources, beginning in 2015 we publish data on Paris Club debt restructurings separately from the data on other official creditors. Where a default has occurred but we have insufficient information about the amount of debt involved, we show asterisks rather than values for the applicable year, and we record the default in the annual global total number of defaults. For some long-running defaults not yet resolved, we show Paris Club country data for total loans, published annually for 2008 and subsequent years, as a proxy for the actual amounts involved. Our proxy has two drawbacks: on the one hand, it may include bilateral loans to debtors that are still performing; on the other, it excludes interest arrears on non-performing loans and so underestimates total values.

**Other official creditors.** This category covers loan arrears by governments due to the MLIs and bilateral official creditors, including national export credit and development agencies, not shown separately. In most cases, our source for the country-by-country data is the World Bank’s World DataBank, which reports cumulative annual amounts of unpaid interest and principal, as well as restructured debt and writeoffs of interest and principal, in the years they occurred.³ We use this data as our proxy for annual amounts of other official debt in default on a country-by-country and aggregate basis from 1975 onwards. There are two main drawbacks with this approach. First, to some degree, the country totals will underestimate the annual value of official debt in default, because they do not take account of the total loan amounts outstanding when payment defaults

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³ The World DataBank data on official creditors’ arrears exclude arrears on IMF lending.
take place. Second, as highlighted by Cruces and Trebesch (2011), there may be errors in some of the country data the World Bank reports. Despite these shortcomings, we believe that our proxy provides a reasonable approximation of the global amounts of this category of debt in default since 1975.

To calculate annual country-by-country values for the other official creditor category, and to minimize double counting, where relevant we make the following adjustments: we deduct World Bank loans in arrears in each year they are reported from the official creditor total; and we deduct restructured Paris Club debt from the residual official creditor values in years when the latter are larger. We make this second adjustment because the World DataBank records restructured official debt and debt writeoffs in the years they occur, while the Paris Club reports its data in the year agreements are reached with the debtor government.

Our treatment of Liberia’s official arrears in 2008 illustrates how we make these adjustments. To start, for this category the World DataBank reports cumulative arrears of principal and interest arrears, plus writeoffs of principal and interest during the year, as US$1,233 million. From this total, we subtract World Bank arrears of US$179 million reported separately, and Paris Club restructurings of principal and interest of US$1,043 reported separately. The residual, US$11 million, is recorded in the other official creditor category of the database.

**Private creditors.** This category refers to foreign currency-denominated lending to governments by foreign commercial creditors, including bondholders, banks and suppliers. Our source for the country-by-country data is the World Bank’s World DataBank, which reports cumulative annual amounts of unpaid interest and principal for this category of creditors, as well as writeoffs and restructurings. This data set has the same drawbacks as for the official creditor data taken from the same source. We utilize these data in cases where we do not have separate data on bank loans and bonds, and when the reported private creditor amounts are larger than the available data on bank loans and bonds. To minimize double counting, in such cases we subtract the annual bank loans and bond amounts from the annual private creditor values. Where a default has occurred but we have insufficient information to estimate the amount of debt involved, we show asterisks

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4 Cruces and Trebesch cite instances where data on debt restructurings from this source contained errors.
rather than values for the applicable year, and we record the default in the annual global total number of defaults.

**Foreign currency bank loans.** This category refers to foreign currency-denominated bilateral and syndicated loans to governments by commercial banks. For bank loan defaults resolved through a formal restructuring process and involving interest arrears, the amounts of debt restructured (or subject to debt buybacks) reported by Cruces and Trebesch (2011) and others generally serve as our starting point. Utilizing available information on the original terms of the loans, which usually include a variable rate of interest (typically LIBOR) plus a spread, we compute cumulative interest arrears for the years prior to the resolution of the default and add them to the loan amounts outstanding for each year that loans are determined to be in default. In cases where bank debt restructurings are not preceded by a payment default, we include the debt amount in the year(s) in which the workout process occurred. Where bank loan defaults remain unresolved, we develop our annual estimates of default amounts from information on the original loans reported by Exotix (2011) and others; these data could ultimately be revised based on updated information as and when the debt is formally restructured. When defaulted obligations are denominated in another currency, we use applicable end-of-period exchange rates to convert amounts into U.S. dollars. Where a default has occurred but we have insufficient information to estimate the amount of debt involved, we show asterisks rather than values for the applicable year, and we record the default in the annual global total number of defaults.

**Foreign currency bonds.** This category refers to foreign currency-denominated bonds and other marketable securities issued by governments. Where bond interest is due but unpaid, we estimate cumulative interest arrears for the years from the start to the end of the bond default based on reported bond coupons. We add these amounts to the outstanding face value of the bond for each year of default. In cases where no payment default has occurred but old bonds are subject to an exchange proposed by the government for new bonds, which results in creditor losses, we view the face value of eligible bonds to be in default from the point when an exchange is announced to when it is completed. We view a resumption of normal debt service on existing bonds or, more typically, the completion of a bond exchange as the point at which a bond default has been resolved. This is the case in a bond exchange even when some bondholders – known as holdout
creditors – do not tender their bonds. Where defaulted bonds are denominated in another currency, we used applicable end-of-period exchange rates to convert amounts into U.S. dollars.

**Local currency debt.** This category refers to debt issued by a government in its own currency. As already noted, local currency debt defaults are only sporadically reported as such. As a result, our estimates, which are gathered from national sources and/or derived from budgetary interest and principal arrears reported in IMF country reports, are provisional. The majority of these defaults tend to be resolved quickly. Where they persist, we identify the principal amount of the debt involved and estimate interest arrears based on prevailing interest rates on government debt near the time of the default. When central bank notes are exchanged for new notes on unfavourable terms, we use the amounts outstanding reported in the IMF’s *International Financial Statistics* closest to the exchange date. We use applicable end-of-period exchange rates to convert amounts of estimated defaulted debt into U.S. dollars. Where a default has occurred but we have insufficient information to estimate the amount of debt involved, we show asterisks rather than values for the applicable year, and we record the default in the annual global total number of defaults.

**Summary data.** In this section of the CRAG database, the country-by-country data for sovereign defaults are aggregated in global totals. The data on the total number of sovereign issuers are estimated by the authors. Data on the number of sovereigns in default are tabulated based on the total number of sovereigns reported in default in the CRAG database for each year. The global total nominal U.S.-dollar amounts for the Paris Club, other official creditor, and private creditor categories in 2014 are authors’ estimates. Our roll-up of the country data, along with the aggregate value of Paris Club lending, as well as world public debt and world GDP sourced from the October 2014 IMF *World Economic Outlook*, provide a global perspective on the scale of annual sovereign defaults from 1975 onwards.

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5 Holdouts are not always the only creditors who fail to participate in bond exchanges. Some bonds may be mislaid, forgotten or locked up in estates, and such creditors can surface long after the conclusion of a bond exchange. In some instances, the government may later issue additional debt on the same terms as the bond exchange to settle these claims.

6 For sovereigns that are members of monetary unions, debt denominated in the common currency is regarded as foreign currency for purposes of this analysis.
5. Assessing Data Reliability

Using a similar approach to that followed by Cruces and Trebesch (2011), we score the relative data quality of our country-by-country estimates of debt in default. On a scale of 1 (denoting high reliability) to 4 (denoting least reliability), we determine a summary score based on the average of the subscores assigned to four variables:

1. years in which default occurred;
2. types of debt in default;
3. characteristics of debt restructured (e.g., interest rate, original maturity); and,
4. consistency of information from different sources.

Of course, there must be an element of judgment in an exercise that measures data reliability in relative terms. The following example, for Jamaica, helps illustrate the process we follow. We highlight Jamaica because, under our definition, it has been in default on six debt types – IMF lending, other official creditors, private creditors, foreign currency bank loans, foreign currency bonds and local currency debt – at various times over the 1975–2014 period.

For Jamaica, since we have a fair degree of confidence that we have identified all cases of default and the years in which they occurred, we assign a score of 3 to this subcategory. We are relatively confident that we have identified all the types of debt involved in each case, so we score this subcategory at 2. We score our knowledge about the characteristics of the debt restructured at 3, because we are less confident about our estimates of the value of debt restructured in the 1970s and 1980s than for debt restructured more recently. We find that the information from the different sources we consulted is fairly consistent, but since arrears owed to official creditors are taken from the World Bank’s World DataBank and are subject to revision, we score this factor at 3. Finally, averaging the results of the subcategories leads to an overall score of 3.

6. Sovereign Defaults in Historical Perspective

CRAG’s new database and future updates will be helpful to researchers analyzing the economic and financial effects of sovereign defaults from 1975 onwards. The data set is particularly useful since it facilitates comparisons of the scale of individual and multiple default events with earlier
episodes. As such, it can contribute to our understanding of ongoing risks to global financial stability. The commentary that follows highlights some of the most noteworthy trends.

From the historical record, we know that for nearly 200 years the story of sovereign defaults has centred mainly, though not exclusively, on foreign currency bonds and other marketable securities. Cross-border bond financing for governments emerged in the 1820s, when newly independent states in Latin America and other regions, as well as some longer-established sovereigns, began issuing bonds denominated in foreign currency in European financial centres. Defaults soon followed on a substantial scale and persisted well into the 20th century. Defaults on local currency-denominated debt also occurred but were less frequent.

After the Second World War, owing to pervasive national controls on capital movements, cross-border bond issuance by governments fell to low levels, as did defaults, and both remained low over nearly four decades. For a relatively brief period, in the 1970s and 1980s, foreign currency-denominated loans by banks eclipsed bonds in importance. Many developing and East European countries defaulted on bank loans in the 1980s and 1990s, leading to creditor losses. The banks’ subsequent exit from this business laid the groundwork for low- and middle-income sovereigns to regain access to cross-border bond markets in the 1990s, which continues to this day.

The period since the 1990s is also noteworthy because of growing cross-border investments in the local currency-denominated market debt of emerging-market sovereigns. This development helped trigger a number of defaults involving such sovereigns as Russia, Argentina and Jamaica, often accompanied by restructurings of their foreign currency bonds. These latter defaults, though also increasing, nonetheless remain well below their pre-World War Two historical peaks.

Chart 1 provides a snapshot of trends in defaults on foreign currency bonds and bank loans from 1820 to 2010. Because of limited historical bond data for much of this period, we calculate unweighted default rates, i.e., governments in default as a per cent of all governments. For

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7 This section of the report draws in part on previous work published by Cruces and Trebesch (2011), Rieffel (2003), Reinhart and Rogoff (2009), and Suter (1992).
8 The data in Chart 1 are partly based on data previously published by Beers and Chambers (2006).
9 By our count, the total number of sovereigns globally was 36 in 1820, 65 in 1900, 105 in 1950 and 213 in 2014. Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) have calculated historical sovereign default rates weighted by estimated aggregated
bonds, three peak default periods stand out – between the 1830s and 1850s, when default rates exceeded 25 per cent; in the 1870s, when default rates averaged 18 per cent; and in the 1930s, when they reached 21 per cent. Of note, too, is the sharp decline in bond defaults after the Second World War that persisted through the 1980s. The resolution of many prewar bond defaults was the main driver of the fall in the default rate. At the same time, the fragmentation of the early post-Second World War cross-border financial markets limited bond market access to only the most creditworthy borrowers, and so defaults on new issues were low.

Prior to the Second World War, sovereign defaults on official loans played only an intermittent role. Then, after 1945, lending to governments by the IMF and other newly established MLIs quickly gained prominence. These institutions, together with national export credit and development agencies, were launched in part to fill perceived gaps in public finance left by shrinkage in the cross-border bond markets. They increasingly targeted loans to developing country governments on concessional terms, and initially defaults on official loans were low.

By the 1980s, however, the sharp rise in sovereign defaults on foreign currency bank loans shown in Chart 1 was accompanied by growing defaults on loans from official creditors. Even arrears on IMF loans surfaced, although their size was minor compared with other creditors. As seen in Chart 2, public debt in default exceeded US$400 billion by 1990, with debt owed to GDP. However, due to reliability issues relating to pre-Second World War national income data in many countries, we have not replicated this approach here.
official creditors accounting for about 16 per cent of the total. By 1995, the share of official creditor debt exceeded 50 per cent. The factors driving both bank loans and official loans into default were often closely linked, owing to the adverse fiscal impact in many countries from the spike in world oil prices and in U.S. short-term interest rates. The latter directly impacted the cost of syndicated bank loans contracted by many sovereign borrowers and helped ratchet up the real burden of their public debt.

Many of the defaults on official loans continued for long periods, owing to internal economic and political difficulties of the borrowers and the reluctance of creditors to reschedule loans. However, by the 1980s, official debt restructurings led by the Paris Club became a frequent occurrence. Yet defaults on official debt persisted. This logjam eased beginning in the mid-1990s, thanks to the multilateral Heavily Indebted Poor Country (HIPC) initiative, launched with strong support from the IMF and the World Bank (IMF 2012).

Under the program, now nearing completion, 39 low-income governments became eligible for substantial reductions in their official debt linked to implementation of agreed economic policy reforms. Much of the debt was written off by bilateral official creditors, but the IMF and other
MLIs also agreed to participate through the MDRI.\textsuperscript{10} As a result, and as seen in Chart 2, the dollar amounts of IMF, World Bank, Paris Club and other official debt in default have mostly fallen in recent years. The spike that occurs in 2013 resulted mainly from the restructuring (albeit without any interruption of scheduled debt service payments) of official loans to Greece, Ireland and Portugal agreed by their European Union partners.\textsuperscript{11}

Chart 3 scales the nominal value of debt in default by nominal global public debt and GDP to measure the relative importance of sovereign defaults. At the start of the 1980s, defaults had minimal impact globally. However, by the middle of the decade, fiscal stresses affecting low- and middle-income countries were significant – the sovereign debt that defaulted, was restructured and in many cases ultimately written down peaked at about 6 per cent of global public debt. The increase was milder in terms of global GDP, rising from near zero to just over 2 per cent.

Chart 3 also shows that the global footprint left by these debt workouts has since faded, despite Argentina’s big default in 2001 and, most recently, the restructurings of sovereign bonds and official loans in the euro area. Nonetheless, the frequency of such events may be on the rise again and could be more closely correlated with rising public debt burdens than at any time since the 1930s. With many governments grappling with fiscal challenges, these are trends worth watching alongside other potential risks to global financial stability.

\textsuperscript{10} Writeoffs of IMF and MLI loans, which under MDRI can reach 100 per cent, are funded by government donors to avoid damaging the institutions’ balance sheets and weakening their preferred creditor status.

\textsuperscript{11} For Greece, interest rates and charges were reduced and partly deferred, while average maturities of European Union/euro area official loans to Greece, Ireland and Portugal were extended by up to seven years. Given their terms, these official debt restructurings are consistent with our definition of sovereign defaults because they result in creditor losses in present-value terms.
7. Conclusion

The Bank of Canada’s new CRAG database will be useful to researchers analyzing the economic and financial effects of individual sovereign defaults and, importantly, the impact on global financial stability of episodes involving multiple sovereign defaults. Our database draws on previously published data sets compiled by various official and private sector sources. It combines elements of these, together with new information, to develop estimates of stocks of government obligations in default, including bonds and other marketable securities, bank loans, and official loans in default, valued in U.S. dollars, from 1975 onwards on both a country-by-country and a global basis. The database applies a common standard for determining when defaults occur. However, documenting which sovereigns have defaulted, the time frame of such defaults, and the amounts of debt affected can be challenging. While we have relied on sources we consider to be reliable, our database of sovereign defaults may not be exhaustive. Additional information on defaults, as it becomes available, will be incorporated in future database updates.
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Appendix
Below are sources for global and country-by-country data used to compile the CRAG database:

Global Aggregates

1. Afghanistan

2. Albania

3. Algeria

4. Angola

5. Antigua and Barbuda

6. Argentina

7. Armenia

8. Azerbaijan

9. Bangladesh

10. Belarus
11. **Belize**  

12. **Benin**  

13. **Bhutan**  

14. **Bolivia**  

15. **Bosnia & Herzegovina**  

16. **Botswana**  

17. **Brazil**  

18. **Bulgaria**  

19. **Burkina Faso**  

20. **Burundi**  

21. **Cambodia**  

22. **Cameroon**  
23. Cape Verde  

24. Central African Republic  

25. Chad  

26. Chile  

27. Colombia  

28. Comoros  

29. Rep. of Congo (Brazzaville)  

30. Dem. Rep. of Congo (Kinshasa)  

31. Cook Islands  

32. Costa Rica  

33. Côte d'Ivoire  

34. Croatia  
35. Cuba
Cruces and Trebesch (2011), Das, Papaioannou and Trebesch (2012), Exotix (2011), Paris Club (2015), Rieffel (1985). Note: Cuba is reported to have both Paris Club and other bilateral official debt in default, but we have insufficient information on the latter to determine the years of default and the estimated amounts involved.

36. Cyprus

37. Djibouti

38. Dominica

39. Dominican Republic

40. Ecuador

41. Egypt

42. El Salvador

43. Equatorial Guinea

44. Eritrea

45. Ethiopia

46. Fiji

47. Gabon

48. Gambia

49. Georgia

50. Ghana

51. Greece

52. Grenada

53. Guatemala

54. Guinea

55. Guinea-Bissau

56. Guyana

57. Haiti
58. Honduras

59. Hungary

60. India

61. Indonesia

62. Iran

63. Iraq

64. Ireland

65. Jamaica

66. Jordan

67. Kazakhstan

68. Kenya

69. Korea (North)
Exotix (2011), Haggard and Noland (2010), Linzmayer (2013), Paris Club (2015), Wall Street Journal (2012). Note: Russia’s $10 billion writedown of loan arrears is included in 2012 total Paris Club debt in default. In addition to Paris Club debt, North Korea is reported to have other bilateral official debt in default, but we have insufficient information on the latter to determine the years of default and the amounts involved. Haggard and Noland (2010) report that central bank note exchanges in 1992 and 2009 were on confiscatory terms, but we have insufficient information to estimate the amounts affected.

70. Kuwait

71. Kyrgyzstan

72. Laos

73. Lebanon

74. Lesotho

75. Liberia

76. Macedonia

77. Madagascar

78. Malawi

79. Maldives

80. Mali
81. Mauritania

82. Mauritius

83. Mexico

84. Moldova

85. Mongolia

86. Morocco

87. Mozambique

88. Myanmar

89. Nauru

90. Nepal

91. Nicaragua

92. Niger
93. Nigeria

94. Pakistan

95. Panama

96. Paraguay

97. Peru

98. Philippines

99. Poland

100. Portugal

101. Romania

102. Rwanda

103. St. Kitts & Nevis

104. St. Lucia
105. St. Vincent and the Grenadines

106. Samoa

107. São Tomé and Príncipe

108. Senegal

109. Serbia

110. Seychelles

111. Sierra Leone

112. Slovenia

113. Somalia

114. Solomon Islands

115. South Africa
116. Sri Lanka

117. Sudan
Haver.

118. Suriname

119. Swaziland

120. Syria
Haver.

121. Tajikistan

122. Tanzania

123. Thailand

124. Togo

125. Tonga

126. Trinidad & Tobago

127 Tunisia

128. Turkey
129. Turkmenistan

130. Uganda

131. Ukraine

132. Uruguay
Cruces and Trebesch (2011), Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer (2005)

133. USSR/Russia

134. Uzbekistan

135. Vanuatu

136. Venezuela

137. Vietnam

138. Yemen

139. Yugoslavia

140. Zambia

141. Zimbabwe