

# Inflation targeting under stress

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## Inflation targeting: open issues

- Should the target be in terms of headline or core (or )?
- What is the optimal rate of inflation? (see Goodfriend in *estschrift*)
- Should the central bank publish the interest rate path?
- Should bygones be bygones?
- Is price stability enough? (see Hite in *estschrift*)
- What role for the exchange rate?
- How should the output gap be measured?



## The ambiguity of inflation targeting

- Neither the Fed, nor the ECB, nor the Bank of England describe themselves as inflation targeters.
- Or does the Bank of Canada?
- Inflation targeting means different things to different people
- If inflation targeting means achieving and maintaining a low rate of inflation, i.e. price stability, then *we are all inflation targeters*.
- In fact, in this sense, the Bank of Canada has nearly *always* been an inflation targeter, ever since its inception over one hundred years ago (see Ordo and James in *...estschrift*).



## beyond inflation targeting

- Inflation targeting is undoubtedly an appropriate strategy when the initial conditions include a high rate of inflation and the central bank wants to lower it gradually in order to achieve price stability over the medium term.
- Fixing yearly targets is helpful to guide the public expectations and to make the central bank accountable.
- *Inflation targeting* describes a transitional phase, though. It becomes a misnomer once that the central bank has graduated from the inflation targeting class, for the name of the game should then be *maintaining price stability*.
- The term *inflation targeting* conveys the unfortunate impression that the central bank aims at producing inflation.

## Inflation targeting and policy discretion

- Inflation targeting is generally understood to mean that the target can be changed from time to time.
- The notion that the inflation target can get revised according to circumstances conveys the regrettable idea of discretion in setting policy (independently of whether the target is set by the central bank, the government or the parliament).
- What is more damaging, missing the target or moving the goal posts as one pleases? (Turkey as a case in point).

## The objective vs. the operational framework

- The term *inflation targeting*, in the mind of most economists, is understood to imply that the central bank produces an inflation forecast and uses it as a guide to set its policy (nominal) interest rate.
- That is, the general description of the objective of monetary policy (price stability) comes loaded with an operational concept.
- This is not helpful and it can confuse the issues, for which operational framework is best suited to achieve price stability should be treated as a separate question.

## avoiding the mistakes of the 1970s

- In principle, price stability can be achieved in many different ways: monetary control, exchange rate control, interest rate control, ...
- Primal interest control makes for a fundamentally unstable dynamic process.
- A well calibrated reaction function (e.g. a Taylor rule) will restore stability to the system.
- The danger, though, is that policy makers will become complacent and rely exceedingly on their own intuition.
- Is it too late already?



## Inflation targeting: the stress test

- Inflation is on the rise nearly everywhere, due to high capacity utilisation and high energy, commodity and food prices.
- Inflation expectations might be drifting upwards.
- World activity is slowing.
- The stability of the financial system is under threat.

Two features of the current monetary policy concept might prove to be helpful in passing this test.

## • 0 yearly targets dictated by an outside authority

- The *wissenschaftlich* bank act requires the SNB to maintain price stability.
- It is the SNB who defines the meaning of price stability (a rate of headline inflation between 0% and 2% over the medium term).
- It would be inconceivable for the SNB to alter its definition of price stability without sound scientific justification, i.e. simply to suit the circumstances.
- Consequently, medium-term inflation expectations remain firmly anchored, even though inflation has recently been increasing and will most likely exceed 2% in 2011.




## An automatic monetary stabiliser

- The Fed uses the 3-month LIBOR as its operational target...
- ... and the (mostly 3-week) repo rate as its instrument.
- As risk premia increased during the past year, the Fed automatically had to reduce the repo rate, thereby insulating the nonfinancial sector from the financial market turmoils.
- Even though neither the Fed nor the ECB formally changed their monetary stance between September 2008 and June 2009, the outcome, *de facto*, has been quite different.
- In the Swiss case there thus is no need for an *ad hoc* fix of the reaction function (Taylor, Uribe and Woodford); this enhances credibility.




## 3M-Libor in CHF and Repo rate

+ Overnight — 1 Week + 2 Week — 3M-Libor — Target range





### 3M-Libor in EUR and ECB min bid rate



**Thank you for your attention !**