

# The Term Structure Of Inflation Expectations

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# Monetary policy effectiveness

- Monetary policy (MP) matters for the real economy
  - How effective is MP in the US?



### Monetary policy effectiveness

- Monetary policy (MP) matters for the real economy
   How effective is MP in the US?
- "...[the] economic system will work best when producers and consumers, employers and employees, can proceed with full confidence that the average level of prices will behave in a known way in the future -- preferably that it will be highly stable." -- Friedman (1968)



# **Optimal monetary policy**

- In the rational expectations equilibrium (REE), the optimal MP entails a response to shocks in inflation and output
- If private sector expectations deviate from rational expectations, then REE optimal MP will lead to instability
- Optimal MP should respond to private sector expectations or their determinants



#### Questions


- Is there any evidence that US MP responds to private sector expectations?
- If yes, does it lead to anchored expectations?



### Are private sector expectations observed?

- Nominal yields are noisy measures of expectations
- Survey forecasts are supposed to be direct measures

#### The Term Structure of Inflation Forecasts





### Are private sector expectations observed?

- Nominal yields are noisy measures of expectations
- Survey forecasts are supposed to be direct measures
- Is information in yields consistent with that of the surveys?



#### Approach

- We build a joint model of survey forecasts and UST yields
- Measure private sector inflation expectations
- Establish the determinants of these expectations
- Does the policy respond to these determinants?
- Are expectations anchored?
- Implication: Out-of-sample inflation forecasting



### Summary of findings

- Private sector expectations measurement requires information from both yields and surveys
- The expectations are driven by inflation, output, and an independent "survey" factor that is needed to model all the inflation expectations at all maturities
- The interest rate rule loads on the "survey" factor, that is, MP responds to variables outside of the standard set
- Monetary policy appears to be more effective recently
- Inflation expectations outperform those of a "standard" macro-finance model



### Modeling strategy

- It is natural to investigate these issues in a model that incorporates macro variables, forecasts and yields
- Macro-finance term structure model with a twist
- We accommodate macro variables (  $\mathbb{P}$ -measure), yields ( $\mathbb{Q}$ -measure), and surveys ( $\mathbb{P}^i$ -measure)
  - Allows for multiple surveys
  - State-dependent biases
  - Can establish the "marginal" expectations



#### States of the economy



• Factors – Gaussian VAR(1):  $z_t = \mu + \Phi z_{t-1} + \Sigma \epsilon_t, \ z_t = \mu$ 

$$+\Phi z_{t-1} + \Sigma \epsilon_t, \ z_t = (\underbrace{g_t, \pi_t}_{m_t}, x_{1t}, x_{2t})$$

 $\mathbb{P}$ 

Inflation forecast:  $E_t^{\mathbb{P}}(\pi_{t+\tau}) = e_2'\left((I - \Phi)^{-1}\left(I - \Phi^{\tau}\right)\mu + \Phi^{\tau} z_t\right)$ 



#### Yields



### Incorporating survey forecasts

- How do we include the forecast data given this framework?
- Look quite different from each other and realized inflation
  - Biases?
  - Errors?



#### **Different signals**

- Forecaster *i* believes that only her signal is correlated with state variables
- The forecast is computed under subjective measure  $\mathbb{P}^i$ 
  - Related to the heterogeneous agents framework (Harrison and Kreps, 1978; Scheinkman and Xiong, 2003; Dumas, Kurshev and Uppal, 2007; …)



### Asymmetric loss functions

- Forecasters have asymmetric (and different) loss functions
  - Linex  $e^{a_i \cdot \operatorname{error}} a_i \cdot \operatorname{error} 1$
  - The optimal forecast is biased
  - Forecast errors are autocorrelated
- Under regularity, there exist a measure  $\mathbb{P}^i$  under which
  - The optimal forecast is unbiased
  - Forecast errors are iid

(Patton and Timmerman, 2007)



#### **Subjective Forecasters**

Survey forecasters may have different private signals, loss functions:

$$E_t^{\mathbb{P}^i}(\pi_{t+\tau}) \neq E_t^{\mathbb{P}^j}(\pi_{t+\tau}) \neq E_t^{\mathbb{P}}(\pi_{t+\tau})$$

Survey-specific probability measure:

$$\mathbb{P}^{i}: \log \xi_{t}^{i} = -\frac{1}{2}\Lambda_{t-1}^{i'}\Lambda_{t-1}^{i} - \Lambda_{t-1}^{i}\epsilon_{t}, \\ E_{t}^{\mathbb{P}^{i}}(\pi_{t+\tau}) = e_{2}'\left((I - \Phi_{i})^{-1}(I - \Phi_{i}^{\tau})\mu_{i} + \Phi_{i}^{\tau}z_{t}\right)$$

Reported forecasts:

$$\overline{p}_{t,0}^{i}(\tau) \triangleq E_{t}^{\mathbb{P}^{i}}(\pi_{t+\tau}) \triangleq a^{\mathbb{P}}(0,\tau) + b^{\mathbb{P}}(0,\tau)'z_{t} + a^{TBi}(0,\tau) + b^{TBi}(0,\tau)'z_{t} - E_{t}^{\mathbb{P}}(\pi_{t+\tau})$$
Term bias



#### What should we expect to see?

- Measure private sector inflation expectations
  - How do they behave over time?
  - Do subjective and objective expectations coincide?
- Establish the determinants of these expectations
  - How do expectations load on the model factors?
  - Are the factor related to interesting objects?
- Does monetary policy respond to these determinants?
- Evaluate effectiveness of the monetary policy
  - Inflation premia
  - Changes in inflation's persistence
  - How do medium- and long-term expectations behave out-of-sample?
- Out-of-sample inflation forecasting



#### **Data and Methodology**


- 1970-2004, quarterly frequency (140 quarters)
- Macro variables : GDP and CPI
- Inflation forecasts: Michigan, Livingston, SPF, Blue Chip
- Unsmoothed Fama-Bliss zero yields with 8 maturities ranging from 3 months to 10 years
- Estimation:
  - ML with Kalman filter
  - Allow for missing observations (for forecasts)


$$y_t(\tau) = a^{\mathbb{Q}}(\tau) + b^{\mathbb{Q}}(\tau)' z_t + \xi_t$$
 (8 yields)


 $\overline{p}_{t,s}^{i}(\tau) = a^{i}(s,\tau) + b^{i}(s,\tau)'z_{t} + \chi_{t,s}^{i}(\tau)$ (20 forecasts)

 $z_t = \mu + \Phi z_{t-1} + \Sigma \epsilon_t$  (State equation)

### Term Bias: $E_t^{\mathbb{P}^i}(\pi_{t+\tau}) - E_t^{\mathbb{P}}(\pi_{t+\tau})$







#### **Additional Models**

$$\mathbf{AO} \qquad \qquad \mathbf{Y}_{t}(\tau) = a^{\mathbb{Q}}(\tau) + b^{\mathbb{Q}}(\tau)'z_{t} + \xi_{t} \text{ (8 yields)}$$
$$\mathbb{P}^{i} = \mathbb{P} \qquad \overline{p}_{t,s}^{i}(\tau) = a^{i}(s,\tau) + b^{i}(s,\tau)'z_{t} + \chi_{t,s}^{i}(\tau) \text{ (20 forecasts)}$$
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
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
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
$$\begin{aligned} y_t(\tau) &= a^{\mathbb{Q}}(\tau) + b^{\mathbb{Q}}(\tau)' z_t + \xi_t \text{ (8 yields)} \\ \mathbb{P}^i = \mathbb{P} \quad \overline{p}_{t,s}^i(\tau) &= a^i(s,\tau) + b^i(s,\tau)' z_t + \chi_{t,s}^i(\tau) \text{ (20 forecasts)} \\ z_t &= \mu + \Phi z_{t-1} + \Sigma \epsilon_t \text{ (State equation)} \\ y_t(\tau) &= a^{\mathbb{Q}}(\tau) + b^{\mathbb{Q}}(\tau)' z_t + \xi_t \text{ (8 yields)} \quad \mathbb{NF} \\ \overline{p}_{t,s}^i(\tau) &= a^i(s,\tau) + b^i(s,\tau)' z_t + \chi_{t,s}^i(\tau) \text{ (20 forecasts)} \\ z_t &= \mu + \Phi z_{t-1} + \Sigma \epsilon_t \text{ (State equation)} \\ \hline y_t(\tau) &= a^{\mathbb{Q}}(\tau) + b^{\mathbb{Q}}(\tau)' z_t + \xi_t \text{ (8 yields)} \\ \overline{p}_{t,s}^i(\tau) &= a^i(s,\tau) + b^i(s,\tau)' z_t + \chi_{t,s}^i(\tau) \text{ (20 forecasts)} \\ \overline{p}_{t,s}^i(\tau) &= a^i(s,\tau) + b^i(s,\tau)' z_t + \chi_{t,s}^i(\tau) \text{ (20 forecasts)} \text{ OF} \\ z_t &= \mu + \Phi z_{t-1} + \Sigma \epsilon_t \text{ (State equation)} \end{aligned}$$







### **Determinants of Forecasts: Simple Filters**





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$$x_{it} = A_{i0} + A_{im}m_t + A_{iy}y_t + A_{ip}\overline{p}_t + A_{il}x_{it-1}$$

Model	Factor	$m_t$	$y_t( au)$	$\overline{p_t}(s,t)$	corr
AO	$x_1$	$g,~\pi$	_	LS(0,4), SPF(0,4)	0.99
	$x_2$	_	1, 40	LS(0,4), SPF(0,4)	0.98



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•  $f_1$  continues to have strong correlation with forecasts - where  $f_t$  is orthogonal to  $M_t$  ( $m_t$  and its history)


$$x_t = \hat{x}(M_t) + f_t$$





#### Does the interest rate respond to $f_1$ ?

Theoretical $R^2$ for yields									
Horizon	M	$f_1$	$f_2$						
1	50.07	19.22	30.71						
8	41.16	20.90	37.93						
40	38.59	22.63	38.77						


 $y_t(\tau) = y_t^R(\tau) + \overline{p}_{t,0}(\tau) + IP_t(\tau)$  The Fisher equation








#### Changing impulse responses




#### Changing conditional expectations





# Out-of-sample inflation forecasting

- AO outperforms NF by 25% to 60% (RMSE ratios)
- AO is very similar to the survey forecasts
- But, AO is available for any horizon of interest at any point in time





#### Conclusions

- We construct a no-arbitrage model that incorporates macro variables, yields and inflation forecasts in a internally consistent manner
- Both yields and surveys are required to construct inflation expectations
- Inflation expectations are driven by the history of macro variables and "survey" factor
- The implied term structure of inflation expectations is:
  - Reasonable
  - Instrumental in identifying real yields and inflation premia
  - Suggests that monetary policy became more effective over time
  - Forecasts inflation and yields well