M12 - Personnel Management; Executive Compensation - Bank of Canada
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Bank of Canada RSS Feedsen2024-03-28T18:04:52+00:00Outside Investor Access to Top Management: Market Monitoring versus Stock Price Manipulation
https://www.bankofcanada.ca/2020/10/staff-working-paper-2020-43/
Should managers be paid in stock options if they provide stock-market participants with information about the firm? This paper studies how firm owners trade off the benefit of stock-price incentives and better-informed market participants against the cost of potential stock-price manipulation.2020-10-29T10:00:47+00:00enOutside Investor Access to Top Management: Market Monitoring versus Stock Price Manipulation2020-10-29Economic modelsFinancial marketsRecent economic and financial developmentsStaff Working Paper 2020-43https://www.bankofcanada.ca/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/swp2020-43.pdfOutside Investor Access to Top Management: Market Monitoring versus Stock Price ManipulationJosef SchrothOctober 2020DD8D82D86GG1G14G3G32G34MM1M12M4M41Managerial Compensation Duration and Stock Price Manipulation
https://www.bankofcanada.ca/2015/07/working-paper-2015-25/
I build a model of optimal managerial compensation where managers each have a privately observed propensity to manipulate short-term stock prices.2015-07-02T14:06:51+00:00enManagerial Compensation Duration and Stock Price Manipulation2015-07-02Economic modelsLabour marketsRecent economic and financial developmentsWorking Paper 2015-25https://www.bankofcanada.ca/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/wp2015-25.pdfManagerial Compensation Duration and Stock Price ManipulationJosef SchrothJuly 2015DD8D82GG1G14G3G30MM1M12