Shota Ichihashi - Latest - Bank of Canada
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Bank of Canada RSS Feedsen2024-03-28T19:46:32+00:00Addictive Platforms
https://www.bankofcanada.ca/2022/04/staff-working-paper-2022-16/
We study competition for consumer attention, in which platforms can sacrifice service quality for attention. A platform can choose the “addictiveness” of its service.2022-04-04T11:18:35+00:00enAddictive Platforms2022-04-04Economic modelsStaff Working Paper 2022-16https://www.bankofcanada.ca/wp-content/uploads/2022/04/swp2022-16.pdfAddictive PlatformsShota IchihashiByung-Cheol KimApril 2022DD4D40LL5L51Dynamic Privacy Choices
https://www.bankofcanada.ca/2022/03/staff-working-paper-2022-8/
Consumers often express concerns about lack of privacy, but they still give up a lot of data to digital platforms. This paper builds a dynamic game-theoretic model of data collection and privacy protection, which potentially explains consumers’ behaviour.2022-03-04T10:44:07+00:00enDynamic Privacy Choices2022-03-04Economic modelsStaff Working Paper 2022-8https://www.bankofcanada.ca/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/swp2022-8.pdfDynamic Privacy ChoicesShota IchihashiMarch 2022DD8D82D83Non-competing Data Intermediaries
https://www.bankofcanada.ca/2020/07/staff-working-paper-2020-28/
I study a model of competing data intermediaries (e.g., online platforms and data brokers) that collect personal data from consumers and sell it to downstream firms.2020-07-06T14:49:29+00:00enNon-competing Data Intermediaries2020-07-06Economic modelsStaff Working Paper 2020-28https://www.bankofcanada.ca/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/swp2020-28.pdfStaff Working Paper 2020-28Shota IchihashiJuly 2020DD4D42D43D8D80LL1L12Online Privacy and Information Disclosure by Consumers
https://www.bankofcanada.ca/2019/06/staff-working-paper-2019-22/
A consumer discloses information to a multi-product seller, which learns about the consumer’s preferences, sets prices, and makes product recommendations. While the consumer benefits from accurate product recommendations, the seller may use the information to price discriminate.2019-06-13T13:42:12+00:00enOnline Privacy and Information Disclosure by Consumers2019-06-13Economic modelsStaff Working Paper 2019-22https://www.bankofcanada.ca/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/swp2019-22.pdfOnline Privacy and Information Disclosure by ConsumersShota IchihashiJune 2019DD8D82D83Limiting Sender’s Information in Bayesian Persuasion
https://www.bankofcanada.ca/2019/02/staff-working-paper-2019-10/
This paper studies how the outcome of Bayesian persuasion depends on a sender’s information. I study a game in which, prior to the sender’s information disclosure, the designer can restrict the most informative signal that the sender can generate.2019-02-26T14:33:10+00:00enLimiting Sender’s Information in Bayesian Persuasion2019-02-26Economic modelsStaff Working Paper 2019-10https://www.bankofcanada.ca/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/swp2019-10.pdfLimiting Sender’s Information in Bayesian PersuasionShota IchihashiFebruary 2019DD8D82D83