Kartik Anand - Latest - Bank of Canada
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Bank of Canada RSS Feedsen2024-03-29T11:51:51+00:00Asset Encumbrance, Bank Funding and Financial Fragility
https://www.bankofcanada.ca/2016/04/staff-working-paper-2016-16/
In this piece we show that a limit on the level of asset encumbrance and minimum capital requirements are effective tools for minimizing the incentive for banks to take excessive risk.2016-04-14T11:10:57+00:00enAsset Encumbrance, Bank Funding and Financial Fragility2016-04-14Financial institutionsFinancial stabilityFinancial system regulation and policiesStaff Working Paper 2016-16https://www.bankofcanada.ca/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/swp2016-16.pdfAsset Encumbrance, Bank Funding and Financial FragilityKartik AnandPrasanna GaiJames ChapmanToni AhnertApril 2016DD8D82GG0G01G2G21G28Quantifying Contagion Risk in Funding Markets: A Model-Based Stress-Testing Approach
https://www.bankofcanada.ca/2015/08/working-paper-2015-32/
We propose a tractable, model-based stress-testing framework where the solvency risks, funding liquidity risks and market risks of banks are intertwined.2015-08-07T11:53:48+00:00enQuantifying Contagion Risk in Funding Markets: A Model-Based Stress-Testing Approach2015-08-07Financial stabilityFinancial system regulation and policiesWorking Paper 2015-32https://www.bankofcanada.ca/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/wp2015-32.pdfQuantifying Contagion Risk in Funding Markets: A Model-Based Stress-Testing ApproachKartik AnandCéline GauthierMoez SouissiAugust 2015CC7C72EE5E58GG0G01G2G21G28Filling in the Blanks: Network Structure and Interbank Contagion
https://www.bankofcanada.ca/2014/06/working-paper-2014-26/
The network pattern of financial linkages is important in many areas of banking and finance. Yet bilateral linkages are often unobserved, and maximum entropy serves as the leading method for estimating counterparty exposures.2014-06-18T11:49:45+00:00enFilling in the Blanks: Network Structure and Interbank Contagion2014-06-18Econometric and statistical methodsFinancial institutionsFinancial stabilityWorking Paper 2014-26https://www.bankofcanada.ca/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/wp2014-26.pdfFilling in the Blanks: Network Structure and Interbank ContagionKartik AnandBen CraigGoetz von PeterJune 2014CC6C63DD8D85GG2G21LL1L14Stress Testing the Canadian Banking System: A System-Wide Approach
https://www.bankofcanada.ca/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/fsr-june2014-anand.pdf
Stress testing is an important tool used by financial authorities and entities around the world to evaluate potential risks to the financial system. Kartik Anand, Guillaume Bédard-Pagé and Virginie Traclet discuss different stress-testing approaches, with emphasis on the innovative and analytically rigorous model developed by the Bank of Canada: the MacroFinancial Risk Assessment Framework (MFRAF). They also present the stress-test results obtained in the context of the 2013 Canada Financial Sector Assessment Program led by the International Monetary Fund, including the important contributions made by the use of MFRAF in the exercise.2014-06-12T10:30:47+00:00enStress Testing the Canadian Banking System: A System-Wide Approach2014-06-12The Safety of Government Debt
https://www.bankofcanada.ca/2013/10/working-paper-2013-34/
We examine the safety of government bonds in the presence of Knightian uncertainty amongst financial market participants. In our model, the information insensitivity of government bonds is driven by strategic complementarities across counterparties and the structure of trading relationships.2013-10-01T10:44:04+00:00enThe Safety of Government Debt2013-10-01Economic modelsFinancial stabilityInternational financial marketsWorking Paper 2013-34https://www.bankofcanada.ca/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/wp2013-34.pdfThe Safety of Government DebtKartik AnandPrasanna GaiOctober 2013DD8D81EE4E44FF0F02F4F41GG1G15The ‘Celtic Crisis’: Guarantees, Transparency and Systemic Liquidity Risk
https://www.bankofcanada.ca/2013/09/working-paper-2013-31/
Bank liability guarantee schemes have traditionally been viewed as costless measures to shore up investor confidence and prevent bank runs. However, as the experiences of some European countries, most notably Ireland, have demonstrated, the credibility and effectiveness of these guarantees are crucially intertwined with the sovereign’s funding risks.2013-09-05T10:50:21+00:00enThe ‘Celtic Crisis’: Guarantees, Transparency and Systemic Liquidity Risk2013-09-05Financial stabilityFinancial system regulation and policiesWorking Paper 2013-31https://www.bankofcanada.ca/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/wp2013-31.pdfThe ‘Celtic Crisis’: Guarantees, Transparency and Systemic Liquidity RiskPhilipp KönigKartik AnandFrank HeinemannSeptember 2013DD8D89GG0G01G2G28