Yu Zhu - Latest - Bank of Canada
https://www.bankofcanada.ca/rss-feeds/
Bank of Canada RSS Feedsen2024-03-29T11:53:53+00:00Central Bank Digital Currency and Banking Choices
https://www.bankofcanada.ca/2024/02/staff-working-paper-2024-4/
To what extent does a central bank digital currency (CBDC) compete with bank deposits? To answer this question, we develop and estimate a structural model where each household chooses which financial institution to deposit their digital money with.2024-02-08T09:27:59+00:00enCentral Bank Digital Currency and Banking Choices2024-02-08Central bank researchDigital currencies and fintechStaff Working Paper 2024-4https://www.bankofcanada.ca/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/swp2024-4.pdfCentral Bank Digital Currency and Banking ChoicesJiaqi LiAndrew UsherYu ZhuFebruary 2024EE5E50E58Endogenous Liquidity and Capital Reallocation
https://www.bankofcanada.ca/2022/06/staff-working-paper-2022-27/
We study economies where firms acquire capital in primary markets then retrade it in secondary markets after information on idiosyncratic productivity arrives. Our secondary markets incorporate bilateral trade with search, bargaining and liquidity frictions.2022-06-17T09:32:18+00:00enEndogenous Liquidity and Capital Reallocation2022-06-17Business fluctuations and cyclesMonetary policyStaff Working Paper 2022-27https://www.bankofcanada.ca/wp-content/uploads/2022/06/swp2022-27.pdfEndogenous Liquidity and Capital ReallocationWei CuiRandall WrightYu ZhuJune 2022EE2E22E4E44Best Before? Expiring Central Bank Digital Currency and Loss Recovery
https://www.bankofcanada.ca/2021/12/staff-working-paper-2021-67/
We consider introducing an expiry date for offline digital currency balances. Consumers whose digital cash expired would automatically receive the funds back into their online account. This functionality could increase demand for digital cash, with the time to expiry playing a key role.2021-12-24T10:14:51+00:00enBest Before? Expiring Central Bank Digital Currency and Loss Recovery2021-12-24Digital currencies and fintechStaff Working Paper 2021-67https://www.bankofcanada.ca/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/swp2021-67.pdfStaff Working Paper 2021-67Charles M. KahnMaarten van OordtYu ZhuDecember 2021EE4E41E42Monetary Policy Pass-Through with Central Bank Digital Currency
https://www.bankofcanada.ca/2021/03/staff-working-paper-2021-10/
Many central banks are considering issuing a central bank digital currency (CBDC). This would introduce a new policy tool—interest on CBDC. We investigate how this new tool would interact with traditional monetary policy tools, such as the interest on central bank reserves.2021-03-12T10:23:25+00:00enMonetary Policy Pass-Through with Central Bank Digital Currency2021-03-12Digital currencies and fintechMonetary policy transmissionStaff Working Paper 2021-10https://www.bankofcanada.ca/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/swp2021-10.pdfStaff Working Paper 2021-10Janet Hua JiangYu ZhuMarch 2021EE5E50E52Safe Payments
https://www.bankofcanada.ca/2020/12/staff-working-paper-2020-53/
In a cashless economy, would the private sector invest in the optimal level of safety in a deposit-based payment system? In general, because of externalities, the answer is no. While the private sector could over- or under-invest in safety, the government can use taxes or subsidies to correct private incentives.2020-12-11T07:54:12+00:00enSafe Payments2020-12-11Central bank researchDigital currencies and fintechFinancial institutionsPayment clearing and settlement systemsStaff Working Paper 2020-53https://www.bankofcanada.ca/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/swp2020-53.pdfSafe PaymentsJonathan ChiuMohammad DavoodalhosseiniJanet Hua JiangYu ZhuDecember 2020EE4E42E5E50GG2G21Bank Market Power and Central Bank Digital Currency: Theory and Quantitative Assessment
https://www.bankofcanada.ca/2019/05/staff-working-paper-2019-20/
We show that issuing a deposit-like central bank digital currency (CBDC) with a proper interest rate would encourage banks to pay higher interest to keep their customers. Banks would then attract more deposits and offer more loans. Hence, a CBDC would not necessarily crowd out private banking.2019-05-30T12:58:57+00:00enBank Market Power and Central Bank Digital Currency: Theory and Quantitative Assessment2019-05-30Digital currencies and fintechMarket structure and pricingMonetary policyMonetary policy frameworkStaff Working Paper 2019-20https://www.bankofcanada.ca/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/swp2019-20.pdfCentral Bank Digital Currency and BankingJonathan ChiuMohammad DavoodalhosseiniJanet Hua JiangYu ZhuMay 2019EE5E50E58Frictional Capital Reallocation I: Ex Ante Heterogeneity
https://www.bankofcanada.ca/2019/01/staff-working-paper-2019-4/
This paper studies dynamic general equilibrium models where firms trade capital in frictional markets. Gains from trade arise due to ex ante heterogeneity: some firms are better at investment, so they build capital in the primary market; others acquire it in the secondary market.2019-01-14T10:07:35+00:00enFrictional Capital Reallocation I: Ex Ante Heterogeneity2019-01-14Monetary policyStaff Working Paper 2019-4https://www.bankofcanada.ca/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/swp2019-4.pdfFrictional Capital Reallocation I: Ex Ante HeterogeneityRandall WrightSylvia Xiaolin XiaoYu ZhuJanuary 2019EE2E22E4E44A Framework for Analyzing Monetary Policy in an Economy with E-money
https://www.bankofcanada.ca/2019/01/staff-working-paper-2019-1/
This paper considers an economy where central-bank-issued fiat money competes with privately issued e-money. We study a policy-setting game between the central bank and the e-money issuer and find (1) the optimal monetary policy of the central bank depends on the policy of the private issuer and may deviate from the Friedman rule; (2) multiple equilibria may exist; (3) when the economy approaches a cashless state, the central bank’s optimal policy improves the market power of the e-money issuer and can lead to a discrete decrease in welfare and a discrete increase in inflation; and (4) first best cannot be achieved.2019-01-14T08:58:59+00:00enA Framework for Analyzing Monetary Policy in an Economy with E-money2019-01-14Digital currencies and fintechMonetary policyStaff Working Paper 2019-1https://www.bankofcanada.ca/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/swp2019-1.pdfA Framework for Analyzing Monetary Policy in an Economy with E-moneyYu ZhuScott HendryJanuary 2019EE5E52Identification and Estimation of Risk Aversion in First-Price Auctions with Unobserved Auction Heterogeneity
https://www.bankofcanada.ca/2016/05/staff-working-paper-2016-23/
This paper shows point identification in first-price auction models with risk aversion and unobserved auction heterogeneity by exploiting multiple bids from each auction and variation in the number of bidders. The required exclusion restriction is shown to be consistent with a large class of entry models.2016-05-09T08:48:48+00:00enIdentification and Estimation of Risk Aversion in First-Price Auctions with Unobserved Auction Heterogeneity2016-05-09Econometric and statistical methodsStaff Working Paper 2016-23https://www.bankofcanada.ca/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/swp2016-23.pdfIdentification and Estimation of Risk Aversion in First-Price Auctions with Unobserved Auction HeterogeneitySerafin GrundlYu ZhuMay 2016CC1C14C5C57DD4D44LL0L00