Yu Zhu - Latest - Bank of Canada
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Bank of Canada RSS Feedsen2024-03-28T17:11:21+00:00Bank Market Power and Central Bank Digital Currency: Theory and Quantitative Assessment
https://www.bankofcanada.ca/2019/05/staff-working-paper-2019-20/
We show that issuing a deposit-like central bank digital currency (CBDC) with a proper interest rate would encourage banks to pay higher interest to keep their customers. Banks would then attract more deposits and offer more loans. Hence, a CBDC would not necessarily crowd out private banking.2019-05-30T12:58:57+00:00enBank Market Power and Central Bank Digital Currency: Theory and Quantitative Assessment2019-05-30Digital currencies and fintechMarket structure and pricingMonetary policyMonetary policy frameworkStaff Working Paper 2019-20https://www.bankofcanada.ca/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/swp2019-20.pdfCentral Bank Digital Currency and BankingJonathan ChiuMohammad DavoodalhosseiniJanet Hua JiangYu ZhuMay 2019EE5E50E58Frictional Capital Reallocation I: Ex Ante Heterogeneity
https://www.bankofcanada.ca/2019/01/staff-working-paper-2019-4/
This paper studies dynamic general equilibrium models where firms trade capital in frictional markets. Gains from trade arise due to ex ante heterogeneity: some firms are better at investment, so they build capital in the primary market; others acquire it in the secondary market.2019-01-14T10:07:35+00:00enFrictional Capital Reallocation I: Ex Ante Heterogeneity2019-01-14Monetary policyStaff Working Paper 2019-4https://www.bankofcanada.ca/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/swp2019-4.pdfFrictional Capital Reallocation I: Ex Ante HeterogeneityRandall WrightSylvia Xiaolin XiaoYu ZhuJanuary 2019EE2E22E4E44A Framework for Analyzing Monetary Policy in an Economy with E-money
https://www.bankofcanada.ca/2019/01/staff-working-paper-2019-1/
This paper considers an economy where central-bank-issued fiat money competes with privately issued e-money. We study a policy-setting game between the central bank and the e-money issuer and find (1) the optimal monetary policy of the central bank depends on the policy of the private issuer and may deviate from the Friedman rule; (2) multiple equilibria may exist; (3) when the economy approaches a cashless state, the central bank’s optimal policy improves the market power of the e-money issuer and can lead to a discrete decrease in welfare and a discrete increase in inflation; and (4) first best cannot be achieved.2019-01-14T08:58:59+00:00enA Framework for Analyzing Monetary Policy in an Economy with E-money2019-01-14Digital currencies and fintechMonetary policyStaff Working Paper 2019-1https://www.bankofcanada.ca/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/swp2019-1.pdfA Framework for Analyzing Monetary Policy in an Economy with E-moneyYu ZhuScott HendryJanuary 2019EE5E52