D83 - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief - Bank of Canada
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Bank of Canada RSS Feedsen2024-03-29T11:03:37+00:00Limiting Sender’s Information in Bayesian Persuasion
https://www.bankofcanada.ca/2019/02/staff-working-paper-2019-10/
This paper studies how the outcome of Bayesian persuasion depends on a sender’s information. I study a game in which, prior to the sender’s information disclosure, the designer can restrict the most informative signal that the sender can generate.2019-02-26T14:33:10+00:00enLimiting Sender’s Information in Bayesian Persuasion2019-02-26Economic modelsStaff Working Paper 2019-10https://www.bankofcanada.ca/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/swp2019-10.pdfLimiting Sender’s Information in Bayesian PersuasionShota IchihashiFebruary 2019DD8D82D83