D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - Bank of Canada
https://www.bankofcanada.ca/rss-feeds/
Bank of Canada RSS Feedsen2024-03-28T17:31:16+00:00Limiting Sender’s Information in Bayesian Persuasion
https://www.bankofcanada.ca/2019/02/staff-working-paper-2019-10/
This paper studies how the outcome of Bayesian persuasion depends on a sender’s information. I study a game in which, prior to the sender’s information disclosure, the designer can restrict the most informative signal that the sender can generate.2019-02-26T14:33:10+00:00enLimiting Sender’s Information in Bayesian Persuasion2019-02-26Economic modelsStaff Working Paper 2019-10https://www.bankofcanada.ca/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/swp2019-10.pdfLimiting Sender’s Information in Bayesian PersuasionShota IchihashiFebruary 2019DD8D82D83Inequality in Parental Transfers, Borrowing Constraints and Optimal Higher Education Subsidies
https://www.bankofcanada.ca/2019/02/staff-working-paper-2019-7/
This paper studies optimal education subsidies when parental transfers are unequally distributed across students and cannot be publicly observed. After documenting substantial inequality in parental transfers among US college students with similar family resources, I examine its implications for how the education subsidy should vary with schooling level and family resources to minimize inefficiencies generated by borrowing constraints.2019-02-11T14:03:49+00:00enInequality in Parental Transfers, Borrowing Constraints and Optimal Higher Education Subsidies2019-02-11Fiscal policyPotential outputProductivityStaff Working Paper 2019-7https://www.bankofcanada.ca/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/swp2019-7.pdfInequality in Parental Transfers, Borrowing Constraints and Optimal Higher Education SubsidiesYoungmin ParkFebruary 2019DD1D14D6D61D64D8D82II2I22JJ2J24