L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets - Bank of Canada
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Bank of Canada RSS Feedsen2024-03-29T13:57:07+00:00Inference in Games Without Nash Equilibrium: An Application to Restaurants’ Competition in Opening Hours
https://www.bankofcanada.ca/2018/12/staff-working-paper-2018-60/
This paper relaxes the Bayesian Nash equilibrium (BNE) assumption commonly imposed in empirical discrete choice games with incomplete information. Instead of assuming that players have unbiased/correct expectations, my model treats a player’s belief about the behavior of other players as an unrestricted unknown function. I study the joint identification of belief and payoff functions.2018-12-19T08:12:56+00:00enInference in Games Without Nash Equilibrium: An Application to Restaurants’ Competition in Opening Hours2018-12-19Econometric and statistical methodsMarket structure and pricingStaff Working Paper 2018-60https://www.bankofcanada.ca/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/swp2018-60.pdfInference in Games Without Nash Equilibrium: An Application to Restaurants, Competition in Opening HoursErhao XieDecember 2018CC5C57LL1L13L8L85