D61 - Allocative Efficiency; Cost–Benefit Analysis - Bank of Canada
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Bank of Canada RSS Feedsen2024-03-29T13:55:26+00:00Stability and Efficiency in Decentralized Two‐Sided Markets with Weak Preferences
https://www.bankofcanada.ca/2017/02/staff-working-paper-2017-4/
Many decentralized markets are able to attain a stable outcome despite the absence of a central authority (Roth and Vande Vate, 1990). A stable matching, however, need not be efficient if preferences are weak. This raises the question whether a decentralized market with weak preferences can attain Pareto efficiency in the absence of a central matchmaker.2017-02-15T12:57:17+00:00enStability and Efficiency in Decentralized Two‐Sided Markets with Weak Preferences2017-02-15Economic modelsStaff Working Paper 2017-4https://www.bankofcanada.ca/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/swp2017-4.pdfStability and Efficiency in Decentralized Two‐Sided Markets with Weak PreferencesRadoslav RaykovFebruary 2017CC7C78DD6D61