Joshua Slive - Latest - Bank of Canada
https://www.bankofcanada.ca/rss-feeds/
Bank of Canada RSS Feedsen2024-03-28T23:48:40+00:00Access, Competition and Risk in Centrally Cleared Markets
https://www.bankofcanada.ca/wp-content/uploads/2012/11/bod-review-autumn12-fontaine.pdf
Central counterparties can make over-the-counter markets more resilient and reduce systemic risk by mitigating and managing counterparty credit risk. These benefits are maximized when access to central counterparties is available to a wide range of market participants. In an over-the-counter market, there is an important trade-off between risk and competition. A model of an over-the-counter market shows how risk and competition could be influenced by the incentives of market participants as they move to central clearing. In a centrally cleared market, there may be less risk when participation is high. This helps to explain why regulators have put in place requirements for fair, open and risk-based access criteria.2012-11-15T07:49:08+00:00enAccess, Competition and Risk in Centrally Cleared Markets2012-11-15When Lower Risk Increases Profit: Competition and Control of a Central Counterparty
https://www.bankofcanada.ca/2012/11/working-paper-2012-35/
We model the behavior of dealers in Over-the-Counter (OTC) derivatives markets where a small number of dealers trade with a continuum of heterogeneous clients (hedgers). Imperfect competition and (endogenous) default induce a familiar trade-off between competition and risk.2012-11-09T11:55:55+00:00enWhen Lower Risk Increases Profit: Competition and Control of a Central Counterparty2012-11-09Financial marketsFinancial stabilityFinancial system regulation and policiesWorking Paper 2012-35https://www.bankofcanada.ca/wp-content/uploads/2012/11/wp2012-35.pdfWhen Lower Risk Increases Profit: Competition and Control of a Central CounterpartyJean-Sébastien FontaineHéctor Pérez SaizJoshua SliveNovember 2012GG1G10G18