Payment clearing and settlement systems - Bank of Canada
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Bank of Canada RSS Feedsen2024-03-29T08:34:42+00:00Losses from Simulated Defaults in Canada's Large Value Transfer System
https://www.bankofcanada.ca/2010/10/discussion-paper-2010-14/
The Large Value Transfer System (LVTS) loss-sharing mechanism was designed to ensure that, in the event of a one-participant default, the collateral pledged by direct members of the system would be sufficient to cover the largest possible net debit position of a defaulting participant. However, the situation may not hold if the indirect effects of the defaults are taken into consideration, or if two participants default during the same payment cycle.2010-10-21T14:11:53+00:00enLosses from Simulated Defaults in Canada's Large Value Transfer System2010-10-21Financial institutionsFinancial stabilityPayment clearing and settlement systemsDiscussion Paper 2010-14 https://www.bankofcanada.ca/wp-content/uploads/2010/10/dp10-14.pdfLosses from Simulated Defaults in Canada's Large Value Transfer SystemNellie ZhangTom HossfeldOctober 2010EE4E47GG2G21Central Bank Haircut Policy
https://www.bankofcanada.ca/2010/10/working-paper-2010-23/
We present a model of central bank collateralized lending to study the optimal choice of the haircut policy. We show that a lending facility provides a bundle of two types of insurance: insurance against liquidity risk as well as insurance against downside risk of the collateral.2010-10-13T08:14:48+00:00enCentral Bank Haircut Policy2010-10-13Central bank researchFinancial servicesFinancial system regulation and policiesMonetary policy implementationPayment clearing and settlement systemsWorking Paper 2010-23https://www.bankofcanada.ca/wp-content/uploads/2010/10/wp10-23.pdfCentral Bank Haircut PolicyJames ChapmanJonathan ChiuMiguel MolicoOctober 2010EE4E40E5E50