Credibility - Bank of Canada
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Bank of Canada RSS Feedsen2024-03-28T10:35:06+00:00Adopting Price-Level Targeting under Imperfect Credibility: An Update
https://www.bankofcanada.ca/2008/10/working-paper-2008-37/
This paper measures the welfare gains of switching from inflation-targeting to price-level targeting under imperfect credibility. Vestin (2006) shows that when the monetary authority cannot commit to future policy, price-level targeting yields higher welfare than inflation targeting.2008-10-03T16:16:08+00:00enAdopting Price-Level Targeting under Imperfect Credibility: An Update2008-10-03CredibilityMonetary policy frameworkWorking Paper 2008-37 https://www.bankofcanada.ca/wp-content/uploads/2010/02/wp08-37.pdfAdopting Price-Level Targeting under Imperfect Credibility: An UpdateOleksiy KryvtsovMalik ShukayevAlexander UeberfeldtOctober 2008EE3E31E5E52Are Bygones not Bygones? Modeling Price Level Targeting with an Escape Clause and Lessons from the Gold Standard
https://www.bankofcanada.ca/2008/08/working-paper-2008-27/
Like the gold standard, price level targeting (PT) involves not letting past deviations of inflation be bygones; both regimes return the price level (or price of gold) to its target. The experience of suspension of the gold standard in World War I, resumption in the 1920s (for some countries at a different parity), and final abandonment is reviewed.2008-08-28T11:03:43+00:00enAre Bygones not Bygones? Modeling Price Level Targeting with an Escape Clause and Lessons from the Gold Standard2008-08-28CredibilityMonetary policy frameworkWorking Paper 2008-27 https://www.bankofcanada.ca/wp-content/uploads/2010/02/wp08-27.pdfAre Bygones not Bygones? Modeling Price Level Targeting with an Escape Clause and Lessons from the Gold StandardPaul MassonMalik ShukayevAugust 2008EE3E31E5E52Adopting Price-Level Targeting under Imperfect Credibility
https://www.bankofcanada.ca/2008/02/working-paper-2008-3/
This paper measures the welfare gains of switching from inflation-targeting to price-level targeting under imperfect credibility. Vestin (2006) shows that when the monetary authority cannot commit to future policy, price-level targeting yields higher welfare than inflation targeting.2008-02-03T10:46:39+00:00enAdopting Price-Level Targeting under Imperfect Credibility2008-02-03CredibilityMonetary policy frameworkWorking Paper 2008-3 https://www.bankofcanada.ca/wp-content/uploads/2010/02/wp08-3.pdfAdopting Price-Level Targeting under Imperfect CredibilityOleksiy KryvtsovMalik ShukayevAlexander UeberfeldtFebruary 2008EE3E31E5E52