**Central Bank Modelling: Retrospect and Prospects** 


> Andrew Levin Dartmouth College

Bank of Canada workshop 17 November 2016

# The Federal Reserve in 2005-2008

- During 2005-06, officials at the Federal Reserve and other agencies overlooked warning signs regarding the risk of a collapse in house prices.
- During autumn 2007 and early 2008, Fed officials misattributed the widening of interbank spreads to liquidity factors rather than counterparty risk.
- The FOMC met on Tues. 16 Sept. 2008, two days after Lehman's failure, but still did not perceive that the U.S. might be heading into a financial crisis and a severe economic downturn.


# **Strains in U.S. Interbank Markets**




### FOMC Statement, Tuesday 16 Sept. 2008

"Strains in financial markets have increased significantly and labor markets have weakened further....Tight credit conditions, the ongoing housing contraction, and some slowing in export growth are likely to weigh on economic growth over the next few quarters....The Committee expects inflation to moderate later this year.... The downside risks to growth and upside risks to inflation are both of significant concern."

### FOMC Greenbook Alternative Scenarios as of 10 Sept. 2008



## FOMC Greenbook Alternative Scenarios as of 10 Sept. 2008




Note: Dark shading and light shading denote confidence intervals of 70 percent and 90 percent, respectively, based on stochastic simulations of the FRB/US model.

## A Lone Voice at the Bank of England


"For some time now I have been gloomy about prospects in the United States, which now seems clearly to be in recession. Developments in the U.K. are starting to look eerily similar....My biggest concern right now is that the credit crisis will trigger a rapid downward spiral in activity. Now it is time to get ahead of the curve."

> David Blanchflower, MPC Member Speech to the Royal Society 29 April 2008

### Bank of England MPC Votes, 2007-08



# The Evolution of the FOMC's Outlook for Real GDP Growth



### **Persistent Inflation Shortfalls**

# Market-Based Core PCE Price Index (12-month change)




#### The FOMC "Dot Plot" as of December 2015


5 -----...... ····· 4.5 00 ..... ····· 3.5 .... -----3 0000 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... 2 00000 000000 000 0000 ..... 0.5 0000000000000000 0 20152016 2017 2018 Longer run

10

Percent




## **Persistent Employment Shortfalls**




Source: Levin (JEDC 2014) extended thru Nov. 2016

### Labor Force Participation Rate Females, 45-54 Years Old




### The Wage Curve



Employment Gap

Source: Blanchflower & Levin (NBER WP, April 2015)

### The Wage Curve as of Late 2016



**Employment Gap** 

# Some Key Directions for Model R&D

- Heterogenous Agents
- Demographics
- Adverse Feedback Loops
- Threshold Effects
- Occasionally Binding Constraints

# What Can Central Banks Do?

- Foster an environment of creativity & diversity and encourage "outside-the-box" thinking.
- Formulate transparent & systematic policy strategies that are robust to model uncertainty
- Identify material risks and formulate contingency plans for mitigating such risks; i.e., "stress tests for monetary policy."