Moez Souissi

Understanding Systemic Risk in the Banking Sector: A MacroFinancial Risk Assessment Framework

The MacroFinancial Risk Assessment Framework (MFRAF) models the interconnections between liquidity and solvency in a financial system, with multiple institutions linked through an interbank network. The MFRAF integrates funding liquidity risk as an endogenous outcome of the interactions between solvency risk and the liquidity profiles of banks, which is a complementary approach to the new Basel III Liquidity Coverage Ratio framework for Canada. The calibration exercise presented in the article highlights the vulnerability of leveraged institutions to the combination of low cash holdings and excessive dependence on short-term debt funding. As well, by quantifying the trade-offs among higher capital ratios for banks, increased liquid assets or fewer short-term liabilities in reducing risks in the banking system, the MFRAF illustrates that a regulatory framework that properly controls for systemic risk should consider these three factors in a comprehensive manner.

An Approach to Stress Testing the Canadian Mortgage Portfolio

Towards a Stress-Testing Model Consistent with the Macroprudential Approach

What Matters in Determining Capital Surcharges for Systemically Important Financial Institutions?

One way of internalizing the externalities that each individual bank imposes on the rest of the financial system is to impose capital surcharges on them in line with their systemic importance.

Understanding Systemic Risk: The Trade-Offs between Capital, Short-Term Funding and Liquid Asset Holdings

We offer a multi-period systemic risk assessment framework with which to assess recent liquidity and capital regulatory requirement proposals in a holistic way.

Macroprudential Regulation and Systemic Capital Requirements

In the aftermath of the financial crisis, there is interest in reforming bank regulation such that capital requirements are more closely linked to a bank's contribution to the overall risk of the financial system. In our paper we compare alternative mechanisms for allocating the overall risk of a banking system to its member banks. Overall [...]