Joshua Slive is a Research Adviser in the Market Infrastructure Division of the Financial Markets Department. He has conducted research and worked on domestic and international policy measures related to the reform of OTC derivatives markets. His research also focuses on market structure and liquidity on trading platforms. Before joining the Bank of Canada, Joshua was on the Finance faculty at the HEC Montreal business school. He has a Ph.D. in Finance from the University of British Columbia.
Changes in technology and regulation have resulted in an increasing number of trading venues in equity markets in Canada. New trading platforms have intensified price competition and have encouraged innovation, and they do not appear to have segmented trade. But the increasingly complex market structure has necessitated investments in expensive technology and has introduced new operational risks. Regulatory responses should be carefully adapted to retain the competition and innovation associated with this market fragmentation.Topics: Financial Institutions; Financial markets; Market structure and pricing
An international initiative to increase the use of central clearing for OTC derivatives emerged as one of the reactions to the 2008 financial crisis. The move to central clearing is a fundamental change in the structure of the market.Topics: Financial markets
Central counterparties can make over-the-counter markets more resilient and reduce systemic risk by mitigating and managing counterparty credit risk. These benefits are maximized when access to central counterparties is available to a wide range of market participants. In an over-the-counter market, there is an important trade-off between risk and competition. A model of an over-the-counter market shows how risk and competition could be influenced by the incentives of market participants as they move to central clearing. In a centrally cleared market, there may be less risk when participation is high. This helps to explain why regulators have put in place requirements for fair, open and risk-based access criteria.Topics: Financial markets; Financial system regulation and policies; Market structure and pricing
We model the behavior of dealers in Over-the-Counter (OTC) derivatives markets where a small number of dealers trade with a continuum of heterogeneous clients (hedgers). Imperfect competition and (endogenous) default induce a familiar trade-off between competition and risk.Topics: Financial markets; Financial stability; Financial system regulation and policies